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Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning 
Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis 
Aleatra P. Williams* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2007, Rick Sharga, vice president of marketing at RealtyTrac, stated that with 
more stringent lending and underwriting standards, “we will likely see a significant 
foreclosure decrease”1 within the next three years. However, a sustained and 
considerable decrease in foreclosures has yet to occur. In fact, the real estate market 
downfall and resulting mortgage and housing crisis have proven to be wider, deeper, and 
more serious than first anticipated. Since 2007, millions of homeowners faced, and 
continue to face, foreclosure proceedings.2 To provide protections for homeowners, 
federal and state actors have attempted regulatory and legislative solutions to stem the 
foreclosure crisis. The attempted regulatory and legislative responses, such as 
foreclosure moratoria, have failed to pull the real estate housing market out of crisis and 
provide meaningful relief to homeowners facing foreclosure.3 Many factors contribute to 
this failure, but namely, lack of uniform rules and policies among the relevant federal 
and state agencies for lenders, homeowners, and servicers. This Article contends that, 
with the rate of foreclosures predicted to steadily continue into 2015,4 the need for 
standardized intervention remains imperative to sustain the goal of home ownership, 





II. THE TIES THAT BIND: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REAL ESTATE MARKET AND 
NATIONAL ECONOMY 
III. STATE FORECLOSURE PROCESSES 
A. Judicial Foreclosures 
B. Power of Sale Foreclosures 
                                                
* Assistant Professor, Charleston School of Law; LL.M., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 
University of Oklahoma; B.A., Purdue University. I would like to thank Jenna M. Peyser (2012) for her 
continued hard work, invaluable assistance, and dedication in researching this Article and articles of old. 
1 Maya Rooney, The Forecast of Foreclosure, BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 26, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/Mar2007/db2007/db20070326_901985.htm#fadeto
black. RealtyTrac describes itself as the “most trusted source of foreclosure information.” REALTYTRAC, 
http://www.realtytrac.com/home/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012). 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 See infra Part V. 
4 Mike Colpitts, Housing Foreclosure Crisis Five More Years, HOUSINGPREDICTOR (June 9, 2011), 
http://www.housingpredictor.com/2011/foreclosure-crisis-forecast.html. 
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C. Inadequacies of Modern Foreclosure Process 
D. Unforeseen Consequences of Foreclosures 
1. Prolonged Market Crisis 
2. Burden on Other Resources 
E. Pre-Lending Reform Efforts 
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C. Strict Compliance with Loan Documents and/or Foreclosure Procedures or 
Related Laws 
D. Loan Modifications, Settlement Conferences, and Penalties for Lenders’ Failure 
to Act in Good Faith 
1. Loan Modifications 
i. State Loan Modification Efforts 
ii. Federal Loan Modification and Refinance Programs 
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
i. Mediation 
ii. Mandatory Settlement Conference 
E. Deferment 
1. Delays 
2. Foreclosure Moratoria 
i. During the Great Depression 
ii. Modern State and Federal Foreclosure Moratoria Movement 
iii. The Pros and Cons of Foreclosure Moratoria 
3. The Dodd-Frank Act 
VI. CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
The turbulent mortgage and housing crisis has handicapped the national economy 
for nearly five years.5 With an estimated 2.5 million foreclosures completed from 2007 to 
2009 and another estimated 5.7 million homeowners in imminent risk of foreclosure,6 
                                                
5 Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Monetary Policy and the Housing 
Bubble, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 3, 2010) (dating the 
start of the current financial crisis to August 2007). 
6 Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Wen Li & Keith S. Ernst, Foreclosures by Race and Ethnicity: The 
Demographics of a Crisis, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1, 7 (June 18, 2010), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-
ethnicity.pdf (acknowledging the Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey that finds 
that the percentage of mortgages in the foreclosure process is at 4.63%, which is a historical high since 
1979). The first quarter of 2011 still showed a high incidence of foreclosure. During this time, the ten states 
with the highest numbers of foreclosure were: 1) Nevada, 1 in 35 households were in foreclosure; 2) 
Arizona, 1 in 60 households were in foreclosure; 3) California, 1 in 80 households were in foreclosure; 4) 
Utah, 1 in 98 households were in foreclosure; 5) Idaho, 1 in 106 households were in foreclosure; 6) 
Georgia, 1 in 108 households were in foreclosure; 7) Michigan, 1 in 121 households were in foreclosure; 8) 
Florida, 1 in 152 households were in foreclosure; 9) Colorado, 1 in 157 households were in foreclosure; and 
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debtors and consumer advocacy groups have demanded comprehensive reformation of 
both mortgage and foreclosure laws. Among the chief complaints made by consumer 
advocacy groups were lenders’ failure to communicate before and during foreclosure 
proceedings and debtors’ inability to work toward loan modification without the 
continued threat of foreclosure.7 Additionally, many debtors were victims of mortgagee 
robo-signing.8 Consequently, thousands of Americans experienced severely tainted and 
possibly wrongful mortgage foreclosure processes. Moreover, even those consumers who 
have not yet entered the housing market are affected by being sidelined until this crisis is 
settled. The implications of the broader foreclosure crisis are even more far-reaching; the 
crisis additionally affects, for example, neighbors of the foreclosed debtors, 
homebuilders, and municipalities.9  
The form and type of reformation utilized are vitally important. Reformers must be 
vigilant to create consistent and uniform standards, not piecemeal or conflicting 
standards. Non-uniform standards could lead to unpredictable foreclosure rules for 
lenders or servicers.10 Also, having unclear rules or too many agencies involved in the 
reformation process will confuse or overburden lenders or servicers and inhibit 
consumers’ ability to navigate through the process to receive much needed help.  
Similarly, because the real estate market and national economy are inextricably 
tied, policing the foreclosure process as a reaction to the foreclosure crisis without 
considerable thought and study may lead to unforeseen ramifications for the national 
economy. Therefore, when promulgating new laws that completely bar a lender’s ability 
                                                                                                                                            
10) Illinois, 1 in 160 households were in foreclosure. Melinda Fulmer, Foreclosure Rates: 20 Cities with 
Highest Filings and State-by-State Rankings, MSN REAL ESTATE, 
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=28364347 (last visited June 23, 2011). Though 
ranked third overall, cities in California dominate in the top ten cities with the most foreclosures list for the 
first quarter of 2011. The top ten foreclosure cities are: 1) Las Vegas-Paradise, Nevada (26,275 foreclosure 
filings, 1 in 31 households); 2) Modesto, California (3809 foreclosure filings, 1 in 46 households); 3) 
Stockton, California (4821 foreclosure filings, 1 in 47 households); 4) Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Arizona 
(36,422 foreclosure filings, 1 in 48 households); 5) Vallejo-Fairfield, California (3111 foreclosure filings, 1 
in 48 households); 6) Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, California (29,859 foreclosure filings, 1 in 49 
households); 7) Merced, California (1605 foreclosure filings, 1 in 52 households); 8) Reno-Sparks, Nevada 
(3369 foreclosure filings, 1 in 54 households); 9) Bakersfield, California (4729 foreclosure filings, 1 in 58 
households); and 10) Fresno (4729 foreclosure filings, 1 in 62 households). Id.  
7 Alejandro Lazo & E. Scott Reckard, Bank Agreements Address Foreclosure Complaints, WICHITA EAGLE, 
Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.kansas.com/2011/04/14/1807247/bank-agreements-address-foreclosure.html.  
8 Robo-signing, in short, involves questionable mortgage paperwork or affidavits signed by mortgagees or 
their agents. In a typical foreclosure action, a mortgagee is required to file an affidavit that affirms that it 
has the right to foreclose and verifies the information alleged in the foreclosure paperwork. Due to being 
overwhelmed by the number of foreclosures or out of sheer laziness, many mortgagees took shortcuts. 
Thus, tens of thousands of mortgage documents contain suspect signatures, improper notarizations or were 
signed without a review of the actual paperwork. Many top lending institutions were guilty of robo-signing. 
They include Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo & Co. Pallavi Gogoi, 
Robo-Signed Mortgage Documents Date Back to Late 1990s, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 1, 2011, 
http://articles.boston.com/2011-09-01/news/30102377_1_robo-signing-mortgage-paperwork-banks-and-
other-mortgage. 
9 See infra Part III.  
10 Jeff Jeffrey, Washington Firms Prepare for Boom in Foreclosure Work, BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES 
(Oct. 19, 2010, 4:03 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010 /10/washington-firms-prepare-for-boom-
in-foreclosure-work-.html.  
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to foreclose, or delay the foreclosure process, courts and legislatures must not only 
cautiously consider the specific foreclosure and debtor but also the potential effect on the 
nation’s economy and other arenas. For example, mortgagors, desperate to save their 
homes, could flood bankruptcy courts.11 
To counterbalance the escalation of foreclosure filings, states began transforming 
their foreclosure procedures when filings escalated.12 Courts and state legislatures set 
forth (or are in the process of setting forth) procedures that dramatically restrict a lender’s 
right to foreclose on its security. These new procedures either: a) require consumer 
counseling;13 b) require lenders to jump through procedural hoops as a prerequisite to 
foreclose;14 c) cause substantial delays in the foreclosure process;15 d) completely bar a 
lender from foreclosing for a period of time (or entirely);16 or e) modify redemption 
periods.17 These new policies signify to lenders that the “glory days” of quick and 
relatively easy foreclosure are most likely over.18  
Arguably, these new procedures are appropriate in light of the epic number of 
foreclosures and the potential (and documented) misdeeds by lenders during the pre-
foreclosure and foreclosure stages. For instance, in the age of robo-signing, new 
foreclosure procedures may be justified to prevent debtor abuse or bullying. Typically, 
debtors faced the foreclosure process without the requisite knowledge and were 
unassisted by legal counsel.19 Moreover, because the likely victims of foreclosure are 
                                                
11 Katherine Porter, Consumer Debtor Class Actions: One More Windmill, or the Ultimate Remedy for the 
Subprime Mess?, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (Apr. 3, 2008) (stating that seeking bankruptcy 
might afford debtors “one last chance to save their homes”).  
12 Starting in 2007, the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, which is comprised of states’ 
attorneys general and bank regulators, formed and began gathering data on thirteen of the twenty largest 
subprime mortgage servicers during the last quarter of 2007. The attorneys general from Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and 
Washington are a part of the multi-state coalition. Bank regulators from New York, North Carolina, and 
Maryland and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors also participate in the coalition. Analysis of 
Subprime Mortgage Servicing Performance, Data Report No. 1, STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 
WORKING GROUP 3 (Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/StateForeclosurePreventionWorkGroupDataReport.p
df. 
13 Indiana lawmakers introduced H.B. 1753, which became Public Law 176 (May 4, 2007). This law 
authorized the Indiana Housing and Community Development Authority to create a free mortgage 
foreclosure counseling and education to homeowners who are in or near default of their mortgages. IND. 
CODE § 5-20-6 (2007). 
14 In Maine, L.D. 1617, Public Law 391 (2007), repealed the strict foreclosure laws.  
15 S.B. 651, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011).  
16 H.B. 331, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2011). 
17 See, e.g., S.P. 278, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009) (died in committee) (proposing an extension of the 
mortgagor redemption period to one year for foreclosures initiated on or after October 1, 2009 instead of 
ninety days).  
18 Arguably, these days had passed by what is hopefully the apex of the foreclosure in 2009. The average 
time frame to transition a property through foreclosure increased from an average of 250 days in the 
beginning of 2008 to 450 days by the end of 2010. FED. RESERVE BD., INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF 
FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/interagency/interagency.htm.  
19 Melanca Clark & Maggie Barron, Foreclosures: A Crisis in Legal Representation, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, 7–8 (2009), http://brennan.3cdn.net/a5bf8a685cd085cd0885f72_s8m6bevkx.pdf. 
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mortgagors who had subprime or high cost adjustable rate mortgages,20 foreclosing a 
mortgagee’s ability to foreclose prevents revictimization. Thus, lenders would be 
required to strictly adhere to the new procedures before a debtor loses his or her most 
prized and likely most valuable asset. Additionally, any new measures may be beneficial 
to lessen the burden on limited court resources due to heightened levels of unresolved 
foreclosure actions.21  
State legislatures and courts are not the only actors generating loss mitigation 
strategies in the wake of the mortgage and foreclosure crisis. Other actors in reforming 
the foreclosure and lending processes include: the federal government, lenders, mortgage 
servicers, special mortgage groups, consumer advocacy groups, and borrowers.  
The common thread among all recent mortgage and foreclosure reform efforts is 
the desire to stop the massive bleeding of the self-inflicted wounds caused by 
irresponsible borrowing, careless underwriting processes, reckless or discriminatory 
lending practices, deceptive appraisal of home values, broker misconduct, and sloppy 
foreclosure procedures.22 However, the sheer number of parties involved in drafting 
reform legislation or regulation may prove challenging. As the old idiom goes, “too many 
cooks spoil the broth.”23 That is, with so many parties with conflicting interests all trying 
to create mortgage and foreclosure reform, it is likely that any legislation will be 
contradictory or puzzling, with inconsistent rules. Any such rules would undermine the 
reformers’ intended purpose, providing no guidance to lenders/servicers or aid to 
desperate homeowners. 
It is imperative that reformers strike a tender balance by creating stringent, but fair, 
solutions that address and protect homeowners’ needs. For example, where a debtor is 
either disinterested in saving his or her home from foreclosure, or is financially unable to 
do so (even if the mortgage is modified), any foreclosure bar will serve as a burden on the 
                                                
20 Analysis of Subprime Mortgage Servicing Performance, STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING 
GRP., 1–2 (2008), available at illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2008_09/SFPWGReport3.pdf 
(reporting that a “significant percentage of subprime adjustable rate loans are delinquent before they 
experience payment shock from their first adjustment, reflecting weak underwriting or fraud in the 
origination of the loan.”); Redefault Rates Improve for Recent Loan Modifications, STATE FORECLOSURE 
PREVENTION WORKING GRP. (2010), available at 
http://www.csbs.org/regulartotyr/Documents/SFPWG/DataReportAug2010.pdf. 
21 See, e.g., Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. Frazier, No. 2011-05-02-01 (C.P. Cnty. of Charleston, 
N.C. Aug. 15, 2011) (order regarding mortgage foreclosure actions). 
22 See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, US Sues Deutsche Bank Over Mortgage Approvals, L.A. TIMES (May 3, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/03/business/la-fi-deutsche-bank-20110504 (reporting that the 
federal government recently filed suit against Deutsche Bank due to its reckless approval of approximately 
39,000 mortgages for government insurance, costing the Fair Housing Administration $386 million in bad 
mortgage claims). In the lawsuit, the government alleges that the loans were approved without any regard 
to whether the borrowers could pay the monthly payments. The government is seeking three times the 
amount it paid in bad mortgage claims plus punitive damages. Id. 
23 FRANK LESLIE, FRANK LESLIE’S PLEASANT HOURS 395 (New York, Frank Leslie’s Publishing House 
1878). Currently, there are seven federal agencies and multiple state agencies that oversee banking 
regulations and consumer protection. The seven federal agencies are: 1) Department of Housing and Urban 
Development; 2) Federal Reserve; 3) Office of Thrift Supervision; 4) Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation; 5) Federal Trade Commission; 6) Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; and 7) National 
Credit Union Administration. See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 4545 (2011); 12 U.S.C.A. § 248 (2011); 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1 (2011); 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a (2011); 12 U.S.C.A. § 92a (2011); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1752a (2011). 
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lender. Similarly, if a debtor is clearly and wantonly in default, then a lender should be 
able to foreclose without any impediments.24 In both situations, delaying a foreclosure 
action produces only heavy burdens on a lender with no positive effects on a debtor.  
With foreclosures not expected to significantly decrease in the near future, both 
lenders and borrowers are in serious need for changes with lending and foreclosure 
processes and procedures.25 These reforms should have in mind the goals of sustaining 
homeownership, or the “American Dream,” and maintaining the integrity of the mortgage 
process. The complexity of the mortgage and housing crisis requires a multifaceted and 
multi-partied review. However, at the same time, the governing system needs 
modification, modernization, and simplification. 
Part II of this Article outlines the history of state and federal legislative and 
regulatory reform efforts. Part III examines the interrelationship between the real estate 
market and national economy on the whole. Because it is imperative to understand the 
deterioration of the real estate market, Part IV reviews the foreclosure processes available 
in most jurisdictions and discusses the shortcomings revealed by the financial downturn. 
The current and forecasted changes to these foreclosure and lending processes are 
discussed in Part V. Part VI concludes by arguing that successful transformation of the 
lending and foreclosure practices and procedures is difficult when there are too many 
parties involved in the process. Reform is possible if lenders and consumers take 
affirmative steps to mitigate losses by: 1) educating the public on credit, types of credit, 
and foreclosure before any consumer credit transaction for the purchase of a primary 
residence is consummated; 2) requiring lenders and their underwriters to offer the 
appropriate loan products to borrowers based on a borrower’s current and provable 
financial status; 3) streamlining and standardizing banking and servicing regulations; and 
4) modernizing foreclosure procedures. Further, any revisions should include steep 
penalties for noncompliance in order to establish lender accountability, which will 
ultimately give rise to a sustainable and stable housing market. Though many have 
speculated, the length of the yawn of this crisis is very uncertain. However, changes are 
                                                
24 Many borrowers are choosing to “strategically default” when the property values have plummeted to 
levels far less than unpaid mortgage balances. See Brad Tuttle, Strategic Mortgage Default: The 
Irresponsible, Amoral, but Best Strategy?, TIME MONEYLAND (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://moneyland.time.com/2010/01/11/strategic-mortgage-default-the-irresponsible-amoral-but-best-
strategy/.  
25 It should be noted that not all economists agree as to when the real estate market will recover. See Better, 
but Still Not Good Enough, FREDDIE MAC, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (May 
2011), www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/docs/May_2011_public_outlook.pdf (forecasting that the real 
estate market will ultimately bottom out by Winter 2012); Vivien Lou Chen & Joshua Zumbrun, Fed’s 
Yellen Says U.S. Housing Market Will Undergo a “Drawn-Out” Recovery, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 9, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-09/fed-s-yellen-says-u-s-housing-market-to-have-long-
drawn-out-recovery.html (quoting Federal Reserve Vice Chairperson Janet Yellen that once solutions for 
the housing crisis have been discovered, “recovery in the housing market will likely be a long, drawn-out 
process.”); Colpitts, supra note 4; Gary Lucido, Housing Market Not Likely to Recover Fast, CHICAGO 
REAL ESTATE (June 23, 2010), http://www.chicagonow.com/blogs/chicago-real-estate-getting-
real/2010/06/no-big-recovery-for-housing-market.html; Palash R. Ghosh, Housing Market May Not 
Normalize for Another Five Years, INT’L BUS.TIMES (Aug. 24, 2010), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/45867/20100824/housing-recession.htm; William Alden, Home Prices 
Could Drop for the Next Three Years: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/15/home-prices-could-drop_n_717660.html. 
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underway to transform lending and foreclosure practices that will, hopefully, protect 
consumers from predatory or discriminatory lending practices, sustain and create new 
homeownership opportunities, adequately guide lenders or servicers, and stabilize the real 
estate market.  
I. BACKGROUND 
Legislators, responding to distressed homeowners’ cries and witnessing the 
devastating impact on their states’ economies, scrambled to introduce and enact 
legislation to halt the economic downward spiral. From January 2007 to June 2011, 
lawmakers across the country progressively introduced and enacted foreclosure reform 
legislation. In 2007, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia presented foreclosure 
legislation; nineteen states and the District of Columbia enacted legislation.26 Legislators 
became more active in 2008. Thirty jurisdictions plus the District of Columbia generated 
foreclosure legislation.27 In 2009, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico considered legislation related to foreclosures; thirty-three jurisdictions and Puerto 
Rico enacted legislation.28 Lawmakers in forty states and the District of Columbia 
introduced foreclosure legislation in 2010.29 That same year, twenty-six jurisdictions and 
the District of Columbia enacted foreclosure legislation.30 Every year, it appears that 
states become more aggressive in pursuing foreclosure reform. From January to June 
2011, state legislators in forty-five jurisdictions have proposed foreclosure legislation.31  
These reformation measures respond to delinquent debtors and consumer advocacy 
groups’ demands for mortgage foreclosure reform in light of extremely flawed 
foreclosure procedures. These groups argue that the current procedures are fundamentally 
unfair to defaulting debtors, riddled with inaccuracies and lack of oversight.32 As such, 
they have demanded an overhaul of foreclosure processes.33 
The mortgage and housing meltdown has highlighted other issues such as flawed 
lending processes. For instance, certain types of loan products, such as adjustable rate 
                                                
26 Foreclosure 2007 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12513 
(last updated Jan. 21, 2009). 
27 Foreclosure 2008 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12510 
(last updated Jan. 21, 2009). 
28 Foreclosure 2009 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12513 
(last updated Jan. 5, 2010). 
29 Foreclosure 2010 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org?tabid=12513 
(last updated Jan. 25, 2011). 
30 Id. 
31 Foreclosures 2011 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/banking/foreclosures-2011-legislation.aspx (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (stating that “lawmakers 
in [forty-five] jurisdictions and the District of Columbia have introduced legislation regarding foreclosure” 
in 2011 and that twenty-two “states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have enacted legislation or 
adopted resolutions” as of June 29, 2011).  
32 The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards: Hearings Before S. Subcomm. on Housing, 
Transportation and Community Development of the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (May 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/testimony-thompson-mortgage-
servicing-standards.pdf (written testimony of Diane E. Thompson) [hereinafter Testimony of Thompson].  
33 Lazo & Reckard, supra note 7. 
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mortgages, have proven problematic. Though the foreclosure process has touched the 
prime market, its effect on the subprime market is quite lopsided.34 Numerous borrowers 
who purchased their homes with subprime adjustable rate mortgages are unable to repay 
their loans.35 Accordingly, these borrowers must decide whether they should refinance, 
sell, or walk away from their homes.36 This has been called a “kind of devil’s 
dilemma.”37  
Many of the reformers seem to ignore the fact that lenders are in the lending 
business. That is, lenders lend money to make profits over the life of a loan or upon its 
sale—it is the lifeblood of their business. Like any other business, it has a balance sheet 
that must remain “in the black” to survive and thrive. One way it remains so is by the 
repayment of debts with interest. However, if a debtor defaults by not repaying the debt 
or otherwise, then a lender heavily relies on its ability to foreclose on the security given 
for the debt.38 The security given is typically the property for which the loan was used to 
purchase, such as a home, in residential cases.39 Thus, if lenders are unable to foreclose 
on their debts, then they may choose to further tighten credit terms or forgo lending in a 
particular area entirely.  
If foreclosure reform efforts are too stringent, lenders’ decisions to tighten credit 
criteria could lead to the continued decline of housing values.40 If housing prices remain 
low, then it could potentially prolong the real estate market downturn.41 The real estate 
market becomes cyclical and self-sustaining.42 If lenders tighten their lending 
prerequisites or require 20% down payments, then fewer consumers would qualify.43 
Foreclosures further increase the supply of vacant homes, which lowers home prices and 
hinders new construction.44 Lower home prices may result in home equity losses, 
strategic defaults, and foreclosure filings.45 Therefore, and debatably, the longer the real 
estate market slump persists, the longer the national financial condition remains 
unstable.46 To steady the real estate market, and, consequently, the national economy, 
                                                
34 Analysis of Subprime Mortgage Servicing Performance, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
35 Id. 
36 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
37 Id. 
38 GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 2.1 (5th ed. 2007) (stating that it is 
“axiomatic that a mortgage is security for the performance of an act, that is the very nature of a mortgage”). 
39 Id. at § 1.1. 
40 See Rob Garver, Rule That Could Kill Housing Market, MSN MONEY (Oct. 1, 2011), 
http://money.msn.com/home-loans/rule-that-could-kill-housing-market-fiscaltimes.aspx (quoting Bruce 
Schultz, vice president at Spirit Bank in Bristow, Oklahoma, “If the stated policy goal here is to have a 
default rate of 1% or less on qualifying residential mortgages, I am sure they will get to that goal. But you 
could also get to a default of zero by making no loans.”). 
41 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE OUTLOOK FOR HOUSING STARTS 2009–2012 16 (2008), available at 
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/98xx/doc9885/11-17-housingstarts.pdf (recognizing that 
high unemployment, tightened credit standards, or declines in home prices are factors that could cause a 
cyclical downturn market).  
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 19. 
45 Tuttle, supra note 24. 
46 The argument is as follows. If the real estate market persists to have a flood of available inventory, then 
housing prices will continue to fall. Consequently, lower housing prices will lead to more foreclosures. If 
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drastic steps must be taken to halt the foreclosure crisis.47 
II. THE TIES THAT BIND: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REAL ESTATE MARKET AND 
NATIONAL ECONOMY 
The classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of years, is that 
they are caused by excesses—frequent monetary excesses—that lead to a boom and an 
inevitable bust. In the recent crisis we had a housing boom and bust, which in turn led to 
financial turmoil in the United States and other countries.48 
The tie between the real estate market and the overall national economy is both 
undeniable and complex. According to Chairman Benjamin Bernanke of the Federal 
Reserve, “[d]eclining house prices, delinquencies and foreclosures, and strains in 
mortgage markets are now symptoms as well as causes of our general financial and 
economic difficulties. These interlinkages imply that policies aimed at improving broad 
financial and economic conditions and policies focused specifically on housing may be 
mutually reinforcing.”49 As the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
reported in its Fiscal Year 2010–2015 Strategic Plan, “[t]he state of the housing market 
plays a big role in . . . the strength of our national economy.”50 Hence, if the housing 
market is feeble, then the national economy will be correspondingly feeble. 
Without question, the high foreclosure rates have adversely affected the broader 
economy at large.51 The cause of the current real estate market meltdown has been 
debated. Many pundits believe that the demise of the real estate market is due to lenders 
making risky subprime mortgages.52 Undoubtedly, the increase in subprime mortgages 
played a role in the real estate market upheaval, along with a decline in home prices, and 
a higher incidence of predatory lending and lax loan underwriting standards.53 
The deterioration of the housing market has a rippling effect on several segments of 
the economy. Together, these segments, in turn, have a tangible and devastating effect on 
the national economy. For instance, as a result of the housing market downfall, the 
                                                                                                                                            
foreclosures continue at its current pace or increase, then the overall economic market will remain unstable, 
prolonging the national recession. See EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34653, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM 8 (2008).  
47 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has listed stemming the foreclosure crisis as 
its number one sub-goal in its overall goal of strengthening the housing market. HUD STRATEGIC PLAN—
FY 2010–2015 (2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_4441.pdf.  
48 JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, 
PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1 (2009). 
49 Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Housing, Mortgage 
Markets, and Foreclosures (Dec. 4, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081204a.htm. 
50 HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 47. 
51 Bernanke, supra note 49.  
52 Clyde Ashley & Krystal Wilson, The Credit Crunch and the Impact on the U.S. Economy and Global 
Markets: How Damaging Will It Be?, 16 PROC. OF AM. SOC’Y OF BUS. & BEHAV. SCI. 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.asbbs.org/files/2009/PDF/A/AshleyC2.pdf (suggesting that when the ill-perceived stability of 
the mortgage-backed security market began to falter in 2006, the fallout was declining home process and 
defaulting mortgagors, which together caused the real estate market meltdown).  
53 HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 47. 
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housing market is flooded with inventory in a number of states.54 This affects the new 
homebuilders market.55 New homebuilders must take drastic steps to get rid of their 
inventory because of the competition caused by the influx of foreclosed homes. Due to 
high level of inventory, homebuilders go to extremes to move their new home inventory 
and reduce the number of new homes they build.56 One source estimates that the building 
industry will reduce its output by one-half.57 Such reductions will cause a loss of millions 
of jobs, which would consequently affect the national economy.58  
Also, due to high levels of defaults, lenders are increasingly more reluctant to lend 
and are holding on tight to their resources.59 Not only are lenders extremely wary in 
extending mortgages, but they are also overly cautious in all other types of lending,60 
such as extending small business loans or other consumer loans.61 Additionally, lenders 
are reducing the number of private education loans they offer.62 One of the main reasons 
is that these debts are unsecured.63 Students unable to qualify for private education loans 
may be required to stay in school longer, causing them to increase their federal education 
loans and over debt loads. Accordingly, then, there will be a large number of future 
homebuyers with exorbitant education loans who will be unable to qualify for lower cost 
home loans.64 Consequently, a segment of the population is shut out of the housing 
                                                
54 On May 26, 2011, the Associated Press reported that an estimated “872,000 homes that have been 
repossessed by lenders, but have yet to be sold.” RealtyTrac estimates that it will take three years to clear 
the inventory of the 1.9 million properties already in some stage of foreclosure. Report: Sales of Foreclosed 
Homes Fell in 1Q, AARP (May 26, 2011), http://www.aarp.org/home-garden/housing/news-05-
2011/report_sales_of_foreclosed_homes_fell_in_1q.html. 
55 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 41. 
56 David Streitfeld, Bad Times Linger in Home Building as Economy Rises, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/business/economy/23housing.html (illustrating that homebuilders 
drastically cut home prices or resort to gimmicks such as giving away credit towards new cars). 
57Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52.  
58 Id.  
59 Tara Seigel Bernard, Need a Mortgage? Don’t Get Pregnant, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/your-money/mortgages/20mortgage.html (reporting that strict lending 
guidelines resulting from the mortgage crisis permit lenders to reject loans when there is any temporary 
suspension of income, even if the suspension is due to maternity or paternity leave). 
60 Reportedly, lending fell 40% from $2.65 trillion in 2007 to $1.61 trillion in 2008. See Dennis Cuevas, 
Federal Response to the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., http://www.naag.org/federal-response-to-the-foreclosure-crisis-the-
homeowner-affordability-and-stability-plan.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
61 Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52 (stating that “[t]he crisis has had a major impact on the economy at 
large. Rather than lending money for business growth and consumer spending, it forced lenders to hoard 
cash or invest in stable assets.”); see also Small Business Lending: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Financial Services and H. Comm. on Small Business, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Elizabeth A. Duke, 
Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/duke20100226a.htm (claiming that large commercial 
bank loans to small businesses dropped 2%, or $14 billion, from June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2009); David 
Goldman, Banks Still Reluctant to Lend, CNN MONEY (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/17/news/economy/fed_senior_loan_officer_survey/index.htm.  
62 Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52.  
63 Id. 
64 Student loans are included in a potential mortgagor’s debt to income ratio, which, in turn, makes it 
difficult for mortgagors to qualify. The higher a mortgagor’s debt is relative to his or her income, the higher 
a mortgagor will pay for a loan, if he or she still qualifies. See Erin Peterson, Debt-to-Income Ratio 
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market, which may profoundly affect the national economy. Foreclosures increase the 
inventory of resale homes on the market.65 Strict lending standards prevent consumers 
from purchasing real estate or other products, which keeps the housing market in its 
downturn due to flooding of inventory. Likewise, tight lending in other areas, such as 
small business loans or educational loans, prolongs unemployment and potentially 
inhibits technological innovations.  
As Sarah Raskin of the Federal Reserve asserts, “The wave of foreclosures is one 
of the factors hindering a rapid recovery in the economy. Traditionally, the housing 
sector . . . has played an important role in propelling economic recoveries.”66 Arguably, if 
there is resolution of the foreclosure crisis, then recovery of the national economy should 
soon follow. 
III. STATE FORECLOSURE PROCESSES  
Though the primary purpose behind each foreclosure law, i.e., to protect 
consumers,67 remains unswerving, foreclosure processes vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. States’ processes fall into one of the following classifications: non-judicial 
foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, or mixed judicial/non-judicial foreclosure 
jurisdictions.68 The rationales for selecting one of the classifications also differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As one author previously noted, states might be more lender- 
or more debtor-centric.69 The more debtor-friendly states tend to be judicial foreclosure 
or mixed jurisdictions. The lender-friendly states tend to be non-judicial foreclosure 
jurisdictions. Consequently, the highest rates of foreclosure are in non-judicial 
foreclosure states.70  
A. Judicial Foreclosures 
Judicial foreclosure is believed to be the dominant method of foreclosure in 
approximately forty percent of all jurisdictions.71 It requires a lender to file a court action 
                                                                                                                                            
Important as Credit Score, BANKRATE.COM (Jan. 24, 2007), 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20070116_debt_income_ratio_a2.asp.  
65 Tami Luhby, How to Rescue the Housing Market: Foreclosures!, CNN MONEY (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/31/real_estate/housing_market _foreclosures/index.htm. 
66 Sarah Bloom Raskin, Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Creating and 
Implementing an Enforcement Response to the Foreclosure Crisis, Speech at the Am. Assoc. of Law 
Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20120107a.htm. 
67 Foreclosure Laws, FORECLOSURERADAR, http://www.foreclosureradar.com/foreclosure-
guides/foreclosures-101/foreclosure-laws (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). 
68 Yianni D. Lagos, Fixing a Broken System: Reconciling State Foreclosure Law with Economic Realities, 
7 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 84, 103 (2011) (noting that the jurisdictions are characterized as follows: twenty-
nine are non-judicial foreclosure states, eleven are judicial foreclosure states, nine are mixed judicial/non-
judicial foreclosure states, and one permits strict foreclosure).  
69 Id. at 103.  
70 Fulmer, supra note 6. 
71 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38, at § 7.11. Judicial foreclosure is the predominant foreclosure 
method in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, 
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to initiate a foreclosure proceeding.72 It is universally permitted in all jurisdictions either 
by statute or in equity.73 Courts oversee the detail-oriented foreclosure process. Due to 
this oversight, the foreclosure process in judicial foreclosure takes more time to 
complete.74 In order to foreclose, a lender must take several steps, including a title search 
to identify the parties interested in the property, filing of the foreclosure action and lis 
pendens, notice of sale and entry of decree for deficiency, among other things.75 Skipping 
necessary requirements of judicial foreclosure may result in complication for a creditor or 
its assigns.76 
B. Power of Sale Foreclosures 
Power of sale foreclosures are authorized in a large number of jurisdictions.77 The 
non-judicial foreclosure process has very limited, if any, court involvement.78 To institute 
a foreclosure action, a lender must simply provide notice to the debtor before the property 
is sold in a public forum.79 Typically, this method of foreclosure is less costly, rigorous 
and time-consuming.80 As such, lenders, if given a choice, would likely choose this 
method of foreclosure. 
During the current crisis, there has been an apparent correlation between a 
jurisdiction’s type of foreclosing method and its number of foreclosures. There are higher 
incidences of foreclosures in non-judicial foreclosure states than in judicial foreclosure 
jurisdictions.81 Presumably, this is because of the relative ease, lower cost, and rapid 
conclusion of this type of claim.82 The five states with the highest number of foreclosures 
in the first quarter of 2011 are Nevada, Arizona, California, Utah, and Idaho.83 All of 
these states permit non-judicial foreclosures.84 
                                                                                                                                            
and Wisconsin. Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. (stating that “even in jurisdictions where power of sale foreclosure is dominant, judicial foreclosure is 
required in certain special situations”). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Problems may further delay a foreclosure’s conclusion or cause it to be ineffective as to a particular 
party. These include omitting an interested party, failing to provide proper notice to the debtor or interested 
party, inadequacy of the sales price, problems with bidding and/or noncompliance with statutes. See 
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38, at §§ 7.11–7.18.  
77 Id. at § 7.19 (stating that power of sales are “permitted in 60% of [all] jurisdictions”). Jurisdictions that 
permit non-judicial foreclosures are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. 
78 Id. (acknowledging that non-judicial foreclosures do not require court supervision). 
79 The property may be sold by a lender, a sheriff, or an authorized third party. Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Fulmer, supra note 6. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
84 Four states—California, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah—recognize both judicial and non-judicial 
foreclosures, while one state, Idaho, uses non-judicial foreclosure exclusively.  
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C. Inadequacies of Modern Foreclosure Process 
Irrespective of whether a jurisdiction is a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure 
system, the foreclosure process seems to be riddled with systemic flaws. Common 
foreclosure errors include: a) a mortgage servicer’s inadvertent misapplication of a 
debtor’s mortgage payments;85 b) failure to recognize a debtor’s exemption from 
foreclosure under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act;86 c) failure to prove a foreclosing 
party’s title to a promissory note;87 d) improper endorsements of mortgage notes;88 e) 
backdating paperwork or assignments; f) affidavits without signatures filed or personal 
knowledge of its contents;89 g) claiming inflated legal fees associated with foreclosure;90 
or h) lost or missing promissory notes.91 There are many reports of courts granting or 
enforcing a foreclosure decree or sheriff’s deed that had been improper due to lender 
error or an intervening event.92 
                                                
85 Michelle Conlin, Foreclosure Errors Are Hitting More Innocent Homeowners, USA TODAY (Dec. 13, 
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2010-12-11-foreclosure-wrong-people_N.htm; 
see, e.g., In re Prince, Bankr. No. 197-11992, 2009 WL 2584769, **3–4 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2009) 
(reinstating debtors’ mortgage and awarding compensatory damages in light of servicer’s admitted 
misapplication of mortgage payments). 
86 War and National Defense Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 501–596 (2011). The U.S. Department of Justice reached a 
settlement with Bank of America and Saxon Mortgage (a subsidiary of Morgan Stanley) for at least $22 
million in relief for wrongfully foreclosed servicemembers. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Justice Department Settles with Bank of America and Saxon Mortgage for Illegally Foreclosing on 
Servicemembers (May 26, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crt-683.html; see, e.g., 
Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas, No. 1:08-CV-361, 2009 WL 701006 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
87 Michael Estrin, Finding Common Foreclosure Errors, BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/mortgage/finding-common-foreclosure-errors.aspx; see, e.g., Foreclosure 
by David A. Simpson, No. COA10-361 (N.C. App. 2011) (denying a foreclosure to a mortgagee who failed 
to prove ownership of the note). 
88 Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49–50 (Mass. 2011). 
89 Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., Jamie Smith Hopkins, False Signatures Cloud Maryland Foreclosure 
Cases, BALTIMORE SUN, (Oct. 12, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-10-12/business/bs-bz-
foreclosure-attorneys-20101012_1_foreclosure-cases-corrective-affidavits-maryland-and-florida-
homeowners; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION & 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES 8 (2011), 
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47a.pdf [hereinafter 
FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES] (pointing out that examiners discovered that third party law firms 
often filed lost note affidavits despite most of the notes being discoverable).  
90 Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Dubious Fees Hit Borrowers in Foreclosures, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/business/06mortgage.html?pagewanted=all. 
91 Estrin, supra note 87; see, e.g., Country Place Cmty Ass’n, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition 
Corp., 51 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. App. 2010). Foreclosure affidavits typically include information related to the 
names of the owner of the loan, a debtor’s default status, interest, penalties and fees associated to the debt, 
and principal amount due and owing. See supra note 89 (noting that examiners found that many affidavits 
were inadequate and were expeditiously signed without personal knowledge of the materials within).  
92 See Ann Woolner, Foreclosure Error May Bring Home Break-In by Bank, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-15/foreclosure-error-may-lead-to-break-in-by-bank-
commentary-by-ann-woolner.html. The FDIC has proposed that servicers should contribute to a single fund 
to compensate wrongfully foreclosed consumers. Mark Huffman, Top Regulator Pushes Settlement for 
Foreclosure Errors, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2011/01/top-regulator-pushes-settlement-for-foreclosure-
errors.html. 
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Depending upon when the borrower discovers the error and whether he or she is 
cognizant of his or her rights, a court may remedy these blunders. A debtor may receive 
injunctive relief, a voided sale, or damages.93 On the other hand, some debtors do not 
contest wrongful foreclosures, either because they are unrepresented by legal counsel or 
financially incapable.94 
Another concern related to current foreclosure processes is the possibility of dual-
track foreclosure. Dual-track foreclosures occur when lenders/servicers or their agents 
continue with foreclosure procedures even though they were in discussion with borrowers 
for loan modification or had already approved loan modification.95 This dual-track 
foreclosure is deceptive to homeowners. Homeowners may believe that the foreclosure 
proceeding is on hold because the lender or servicer agreed to work towards a 
modification.96 On the other hand, some servicers deny a mortgagor the opportunity to 
modify the loan, to make it more affordable and avoid foreclosure.97  
However, more disturbing defects in the foreclosure process have come to light. 
With the increased volume of foreclosures, lenders and their foreclosure agents, 
determined to move the process along quickly, have been unable to input safeguards to 
ensure strict compliance with foreclosure laws and requirements. One of the major 
defects that came to light during the crisis is the high level of “robo-signing.”98 Robo-
signing occurs when a small group of servicer/lender’s employees signs a plethora of 
foreclosing affidavits and/or other foreclosure documents on the lender’s behalf; these 
documents are then submitted to courts or other agencies in order to aid in the foreclosure 
process.99 Due to the high number of foreclosures, the signers attest to having read the 
affidavits or debtors files, but did not, in fact, ever read the affidavits or files; in some 
instances, the signers might not have been employees of the foreclosing 
creditor/servicer.100  
                                                
93 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38, at § 7.22. 
94 Clark & Barron, supra note 19. 
95 Alejandro Lazo, Banks are Foreclosing While Homeowners Pursue Loan Modifications, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/14/business/la-fi-dual-tracking-20110415. 
96 Id. (noting that lenders view dual track foreclosure as protecting its investment asset, while debtors see it 
as a “double cross”). 
97 Editorial, Settling Foreclosure Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at A22. 
98 Robostop: The Fuss over Poorly Reviewed Repossessions Exposes Deeper Problems, ECONOMIST (Oct. 
14, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17257787 (noting the emergence of “Foreclosuregate” “when 
an employee at GMAC Mortgage, part of Ally Financial, admitted to having approved thousands of 
repossessions without properly reviewing the documents. The company responded by halting sales of 
seized homes in the 23 states where court approval is required to foreclose while it gets to the bottom of its 
‘robo-signing’ problem. JP Morgan Chase and several other servicers, which manage loans and distribute 
payments to investors in mortgage-backed securities, quickly followed suit. Bank of America has called a 
stop in all 50 states.”). 
99 DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41491,“ROBO-SIGNING” AND OTHER ALLEGED 
DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS IN JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCESSES 1 (2010).  
100 The facts typically attested to by the robo-signers were that original notes were lost or missing and could 
not be produced or that the signer actually read the affidavit. Id. at 1 (reporting that a GMAC employee 
testified that he signed up to 10,000 foreclosure affidavits a month, or approximately 500 affidavits per 
business day); see also Zachary Karabell, The Robosigning Scandal: Foreclosing on Recovery?, TIME 
MAG. (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2026915,00.html; Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), Inc., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), 
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Alarmingly, the vast majority of subprime mortgages, which are more prone to 
default, were made to minorities.101 There are numerous explanations as to why 
minorities disproportionately received subprime mortgages. Historically, minority groups 
living in mostly minority neighborhoods had been excluded from mainstream mortgage 
lending opportunities.102 The exclusion was due to lender “redlining.” Redlining is a form 
of institutional discrimination whereby services like mortgage lending is restricted in 
certain areas, such as predominantly minority neighborhoods.103 When HUD attempted to 
eradicate redlining by saturating minority neighbors with HUD mortgage alternatives, 
many borrowers became prey of savvy and predatory lenders due to lax or nonexistent 
oversight and imprudent underwriting criteria.104 Compounding the problems further, 
investors often did not express any concerns with underwriting standards because of the 
presence of mortgage insurance.105 As a consequence of limited regulation, many brokers 
steered their prey, minorities and the elderly, to subprime mortgages, resulting in “reverse 
redlining.”106 The steering often occurred even when debtors were qualified for 
conventional, prime mortgages.107  
Because the rate of mortgage defaults exponentially increases for subprime 
mortgages, many racial minorities faced more foreclosures than any other groups, 
decimating minority communities.108 One court recently found that a mortgage granted to 
a minority buyer to purchase a home in a predominately minority area, “which carries an 
interest rate exceeding 9.00%, creates a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory 
practice.”109 Though a large number of subprime mortgages fell into default and 
foreclosure more regularly during the early days of the market meltdown, there seems to 
be an escalation in the number of prime and FHA mortgage defaults and foreclosures in 
more recent years.110 Because of these and other shortfalls, the United States is on the 
                                                                                                                                            
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/mortgage_electronic_registration_systems_inc/ind
ex.html?scp=2&sq=robo-signers&st=cse.  
101 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN; INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
SUBPRIME LENDING (Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://archives.hud.gov/reports/subprime/subprime.cfm. 
102 NAT’L COMM. ON FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING 31 (Dec. 
2008), available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/fairhousing/. 
103 Redlining, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/redlining.asp#axzz1akry4jk3 (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2011). 
104 NAT’L COMM. ON FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 102, at 32. 
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 33 (referencing Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy: 
As Housing Boomed Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119662974358911035.html). A subprime mortgage study conducted by the 
Wall Street Journal found that of the subprime mortgages obtained since 2000, 55% of the borrowers had 
credit scores that qualified for conventional mortgages; by 2001, that number jumped to 61%. Id.  
108 Christine Riccardi, 40% of Subprime Mortgages Stand Delinquent, Can Prime Be Next?, 
HOUSINGWIRE.COM (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/09/07/40-of-subprime-mortgages-
stand-delinquent-can-prime-be-next. 
109 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608–609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (quoting M & T 
Mortgage Corp. v. Foy, 858 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)). Higher interest rate mortgages in a 
predominantly minority neighborhood typically indicate discriminatory lending practices and warrants 
further investigation. See M & T Mortgage Corp., 858 N.Y.S.2d at 569–70.  
110 Elizabeth A. Duke, Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Rebalancing the Housing 
Market, Speech Before the Fed. Reserve Bd. Policy Forum: The Housing Market Going Forward: Lessons 
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frontier of new mortgage lending and foreclosure processes. 
D. Unforeseen Consequences of Foreclosures  
From the thousands of reported foreclosure fiascos, it becomes clear that 
foreclosure procedures and processes must be rehabilitated in order to provide adequate 
protections for the consumer-at-large and lenders. However, any modification to the 
processes must be thoughtful, examining the implications of such changes on other areas. 
1. Prolonged Market Crisis 
The foreclosure crisis has had a domino effect in other sectors of the economy. 
According to Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, as a result of the depressed housing 
market, the construction industry is destabilized.111 Even though homeownership is the 
most affordable it has been in recent history, due to low home prices and record low 
interest rates, innumerable Americans are unable to qualify for loans due to tightened 
lending criterion.112 If lenders continue to tighten credit terms, thereby shrinking the 
credit supply and making it nearly impossible for consumers to qualify for loans, then 
one result is the continuation of the market depression.113 Furthermore, potential 
homebuyers have been timid about entering into the housing market due to uncertainties 
pertaining to home values and/or the job market.114 Subsequently, the market would be 
left with a large inventory of available homes, which floods the housing market, further 
lowers home values and stalls new home construction.115 Because the state of the national 
economy is, in large part, tied to the health of the real estate market, an unhealthy real 
estate market will prolong the stabilization of the national economy.116  
2. Burden on Other Resources 
Today’s foreclosures are not only a lender or borrower’s problem; the fallout has 
had an effect on other governmental resources. As the number of foreclosure filings 
surges, burdens on resources in other areas increase, such as bankruptcy courts, 
municipal governments, and sheriffs’ departments. There appears to be a direct parallel 
between the number of bankruptcy filings and the number of foreclosure filings. Since 
                                                                                                                                            
Learned From the Recent Crisis (Sept. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke 20110901a.htm; Shane M. Sherlund, Mortgage 
Defaults, FED. RESERVE 9 (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_center/more_mortgage_defau
lts.pdf. 
111 Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., The U.S. Economic Outlook, 
Speech at the International Monetary Conference (June 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ speech/bernanke20110607a.htm. 
112 Id. 
113 Ashley & Wilson, supra note 52 (arguing that a “credit crunch makes it nearly impossible for companies 
to borrow, because lenders are afraid of bankruptcies and defaults that result in higher interest rates. The 
consequence is a prolonged recession (or slower recovery) and it occurs as a result of the shrinking credit 
supply.”). 
114 Bernanke, supra note 111. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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2006, bankruptcy filings, both commercial and consumer filings, have steadily increased 
from 617,660 to 1,593,081 in 2010.117 Due to the economic issues many faced, 
bankruptcy filings increased to over 6000 per day in May 2009.118 Many bankruptcy 
filings are likely due to the same reason for mortgage delinquency and foreclosures: lack 
of income due to job loss. 
Once faced with a foreclosure action, a mortgagor might choose to save his or her 
home by filing bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or 13.119 In the ten states with the 
highest rates of foreclosures in the first quarter of 2011, a surge appeared in bankruptcy 
filings from 2007 to 2010, with significant growth in 2009.120 For example, bankruptcy 
filings for the top three states of Nevada, Arizona, and California either doubled or tripled 
during the relevant time period. In Nevada, consumer bankruptcy actions rose from 
10,632 in 2007 to 29,161 in 2010 while consumer actions jumped from 10,441 in 2007 to 
41,193 in 2010 in Arizona.121 California consumer bankruptcy filings escalated from 
69,110 in 2007 to 251,396.122  
Similarly, municipalities are burdened when foreclosures cause a large 
concentration of distressed properties in one area. As a recent study on foreclosures in 
Chicago points out, “the focus on credit impaired and higher risk borrowers leads to a 
natural tendency for nonprime foreclosures to cluster in lower-income and largely 
minority distressed urban areas.”123 The study further states that “[t]his tendency for 
nonprime foreclosures to cluster generates significant negative spillover effects.”124 The 
spillover effects include those ills that typically accompany vacant foreclosed properties, 
                                                
117 Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Office of Public Affairs, Growth in Bankruptcy Filings 
Slow in Calendar Year 2010 (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-02-
15/Growth_in_Bankruptcy_Filings_Slows_In_Calendar_Year_2010.aspx. The new release shows the pace 
of bankruptcy filings slowing down, but does not demonstrate a decrease in number of filings. The number 
of Chapter 7 bankruptcies increased as follows: 1) 360,890 in 2006; 2) 519,364 in 2007; 3) 744,364 in 
2008; 4) 1,050,832 in 2009; and 5) 1,139,601 in 2010. Chapter 13 filings also increased over time as 
follows: 1) 251,179 in 2006; 2) 324,771 in 2007; 3) 362,705 in 2008; 4) 406,962 in 2009; and 5) 438,912 in 
2010. Id.; see also Press Release, Am. Bankruptcy Inst., Consumer Bankruptcy Filings Increase 9 Percent 
in 2010 (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=62756&TEMPLATE=/CM/C
ontentDisplay.cfm.  
118 Christine Dugas, Bankruptcy Filings Rise to 6,000 a Day as Job Losses Take Toll, USA TODAY (June 3, 
2009), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-06-03-bankruptcy-filings-unemployment_N.htm. 
119 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2011); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2011); Les Christie, Bankruptcy Can Save 
Your House from Foreclosure, CNN MONEY (July 24, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/21/real_estate/bankruptcy_and_foreclosure/index.htm (noting that 
bankruptcy might be an aid to those with ongoing income over foreclosure).  
120 Bankruptcy Filing Statistics by State, Table: Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by State (2007–
2010), AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&CONTENTID=63179 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Filing Statistics by State, 
2007–2010]. 
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
123 William C. Apgar, Mark Duda & Rochelle N. Gorey, Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Chicago Case 
Study, REPORT FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUNDATION 2 (Feb. 27, 2005), 
http://www.995hope.org/wp-content/uploads /2011/ 07/Apgar_Duda_Study_Full_Version.pdf.  
124 Id. 
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such as, crime, violence and vagrancy.125 
In non-judicial foreclosures, sheriffs preside over foreclosure sales.126 Sheriffs’ 
departments may also deliver service of process, including eviction notices or writs of 
possession and unlawful detainer.127 For example, after the number of eviction notices 
delivered nearly tripled, the Virginia Sheriffs’ Association held a press conference to 
focus on the mounting burden on their sheriffs’ departments due to the increase in 
foreclosure filings.128  
E. Pre-Lending Reform Efforts 
While it is apparent that our country is in dire need of restructured mortgage and 
foreclosure mechanisms, there are several other areas that need attention as well. First, it 
is important to note that a large number of foreclosures arose from systemic defects 
during the pre-lending phase. Complications associated with delinquency and foreclosure 
will continue unless consumers are educated more thoroughly about credit and the 
consequences of credit default. Many homeowners now face foreclosure because they 
accepted mortgages that they could not afford to pay in the first place.  
Similarly, numerous borrowers are uneducated about differences between the types 
of loan products available. As such, some lenders were able to prey on this lack of 
sophistication and offer subprime adjustable rate mortgages. Lawmakers in a few 
jurisdictions unsuccessfully introduced legislation requiring lenders to either make 
prudent determinations of borrowers’ ability to repay the loan or make borrowers aware 
of the ramifications of the loan choices.129 Massachusetts legislators tried to impose a ban 
on subprime adjustable rate mortgages unless mortgagors received qualified counseling 
on the potential consequences of those loans.130 Likewise, Maryland state senators tried 
to prohibit a lender or other credit grantor from “completing an application for a 
subprime loan until the lender or credit grantor receives proof that the borrower 
completed home buyer education or housing counseling.”131 
Also, some mortgage brokers were encouraging real estate appraisers to improperly 
appraise homes for more than they were worth.132 These inflated appraisals resulted in 
                                                
125 Id. 
126 What Does Sheriff Sales Mean in Foreclosure, S.F. CHRON., http://homeguides.sfgate.com/sheriff-sales-
mean-foreclosures-9082.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
127 Richard Foster, Evictions Are Keeping Sheriff’s Office Busy, CHESTERFIELD OBSERVER (July 29, 2009), 
http://www.chesterfieldobserver.com/news/2009-07-29/home/002.html. 
128 Id. 
129 See, e.g., H.B. 2517, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.F. 2449, 82nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Iowa 2008); S.B. 186, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.B. 279, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2008); A.B. 
1764, 2008 Leg., 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008); A.B. 1879, 2008 Leg., 213th Sess. (N.J. 2008); S.B. 1090, 74th 
Leg. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Or. 2008); H.B. 1093, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); and H.B. 1097, 2008 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).  
130 S.B. 2299, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2008); see also H.B. 3345, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 
2008); and S.B. 3834, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).  
131 H.B. 944, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008).  
132 See, e.g., Michael D. Larson, Appraisers Can Burst Your Bubble by Inflating the Value of Your Home, 
BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20000525.asp (noting that there 
is an “acknowledged problem” that loan originators, who may be paid on commission, might “sometimes 
pressure appraisers to fudge their numbers to make mortgages work”).  
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borrowers being upside down in their mortgages. A borrower who owes more than his 
home's worth is unable to refinance and may choose to default on his mortgage, resulting 
in a foreclosure. Additionally, foreclosure on overinflated home values will ultimately 
cause banks losses. For example, it is estimated that Washington Mutual Bank lost $284 
million on mortgages related to inflated real estate appraisals.133  
IV. REFORMATION OF FORECLOSURE PROCESSES IN THE MODERN MORTGAGE  
AND HOUSING CRISIS 
There are many philosophies on what is necessary to reform the embattled lending 
and foreclosure systems. As the new systems take shape, state and federal legislators and 
policymakers have drawn inspiration from historical models and designed new 
mechanisms as well. Because issues related to the housing and foreclosure collapse affect 
various aspects of the federal and state governments, many legislators and policymakers 
have rushed to find solutions. Some of the proposed solutions include uniform servicing 
guidelines, mandatory or voluntary settlement conferences or mediation, delays in the 
foreclosure process or foreclosure moratoria.134  
A. Too Many Cooks: Spoiled Foreclosure Reform? 
As stated previously, there have been many actors, state and federal, involved in 
foreclosure reform efforts.135 Legislatures in nearly every state and Puerto Rico have 
introduced legislation in response to the foreclosure and housing crisis.136 States’ 
attorneys general have similarly proposed solutions to modify current mortgage and 
foreclosure procedures.137 Consumer advocacy groups and lenders are also taking part in 
                                                
133 Mark Puente, Lawsuit Says Unqualified Property Appraisers Inflated Values, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 
11, 2011), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate /lawsuit-says-unqualified-property-
appraisers-inflated-values/1174676. 
134 Some lending institutions have also been proactive in making necessary adjustments to curb 
foreclosures. Two major lending institutions have readily admitted to committing errors during the 
foreclosure process. In 2010, both GMAC and JP Morgan Chase suspended their foreclosure procedures in 
twenty-three states due to “legal missteps.” See David Streitfeld, Foreclosures Slow as Document Flaws 
Emerge, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/business/01mortgage.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1316307736yXaQdV
0xaGfebBEckl2SMA. In New York, seventeen members of the armed services recently settled a lawsuit 
accusing Morgan Stanley of improperly foreclosing against their property between January 2006 and June 
2009 for $2.35 million. Dawn Kopecki, JP Morgan Ousts Mortgage Chief Lowman, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg. com/news/2011-06-14/jpmorgan-ousts-mortgage-chief-david-lowman-after-
lapses-over-foreclosures.html. Critics argue that these voluntary moratoria are not too altruistic, but are due 
to the firestorm and external pressures that followed the exposure of the robo-signing or other foreclosure 
missteps. Peter Miller, Did Unsafe and Unsound Practices Lead to Foreclosure Robo-Signing?, 
MONEYRATES (June 1, 2011), http://www.money-rates.com/advancedstrategies/mortgages/did-unsafe-and-
unsound-practices-lead-to-foreclosure-robo-signing.htm.  
135 For an excellent overview of state and federal foreclosure legislation, see Julie R. Caggiano et al., 
Developments in State and Federal Mortgage Lending Laws: Predatory Lending and Beyond, 65 BUS. 
LAW. 383 (2010).  
136 Id. 
137 See Redefault Rates Improve, supra note 20. 
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the reformation.138  
On the federal level, there are several federal regulators and agencies that oversee 
mortgage lending and consumer protection. For instance, the mission of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Development (HUD) is to “create strong, sustainable, 
inclusive communities” in addition to strengthening “the housing market to bolster the 
economy and protect consumers.”139 Along with the Treasury Department, HUD 
administers numerous programs designed to assist new homeowners and avoid 
foreclosure. Making Homes Affordable is one of HUD’s most recognizable programs, 
from which HAMP and HARP spring.140 HUD’s Office of Housing oversees the Fair 
Housing Administration (FHA). Within the FHA, the National Servicing Center provides 
foreclosure assistance and avoidance strategies to FHA-insured homeowners.141 
Like HUD, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) regulates “banking institutions to 
ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and financial systems to protect 
the credit rights of consumers.”142 One of FRB’s expressed functions includes 
administering nationwide banking and credit policies.143 Similarly, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) stated mission is to examine and supervise financial 
institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection.144 The FDIC issues guides 
for banks and consumer educational publications.145 
Another federal regulator that plays a role in foreclosure reform is the Office of 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The OCC regulates and supervises all national 
banks and federal savings associations. The goal of the OCC is to ensure that the banks 
and savings associations it regulates “operate in a safe and sound manner and in 
compliance with laws requiring fair treatment of their customers and fair access to credit 
and financial products.”146 The OCC is also authorized to issue rules and regulations 
regarding lending and other practices, such as debt collecting or foreclosures.147  
In 2010, the four federal bank regulators—OCC, OTS, FRB, and FDIC—
conducted on-site reviews of the foreclosure policies and procedures at fourteen 
                                                
138 Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32. 
139 Mission, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/about/mission (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).  
140 Avoiding Foreclosure, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/avoiding_foreclosure (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).  
141 FHA National Servicing Center Loss Mitigation Services, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/sfh/nsc/lossmit (last visited Mar. 20, 
2012). 
142 The Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. 1 (9th 
ed. 2005) http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
143 Id. at 6.  
144 FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP. (May 4, 2009), 
www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html.  
145 Id.  
146 About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).  
147 Id. The Office of Thrift Security (OTS) took part in savings association regulation until July 21, 2011, 
when it became a part of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). History, OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/history/history.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
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nationwide, federally regulated mortgage servicers.148 In April 2011, the regulators issued 
a report of their on-site review findings.149 In the report, the examiners exposed several 
critical foreclosure process shortcomings by the collective servicers. These deficiencies 
include problems with servicers’ governance processes, management and control of third 
party vendors (e.g., law firms and MERS, etc.), and foreclosure documentation and 
preparation.150 According to the bank regulators, these shortfalls “resulted in unsafe and 
unsound practices and violations of applicable federal and state law and requirements.”151  
Following the examiners’ review, the FRB issued formal enforcement actions to 
the four mortgage servicers it regulates, requiring the servicers to address the inadequate 
foreclosure processes and deficient residential mortgage loan servicing practices in 
2011.152 Parent holding companies of ten banks were ordered to improve management of 
all residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processes.153 Primarily, the FRB 
mandated that servicers submit plans that: a) improve communications with borrowers by 
providing borrowers with the name of a single point of contact; b) safeguard against 
engaging in foreclosure activities when a servicer has previously approved loan 
modification; c) set forth oversight procedures over third party vendors, such as law 
firms; d) establish a remediation process for borrowers who incurred financial losses as a 
result of wrongful foreclosure; and e) warrant compliance with state and federal servicing 
and foreclosure laws.154 Further, the FRB issued formal enforcement actions against 
Lender Processing Services and MERSCORP. 
In 2010, the federal government added another player to the bank regulation and 
consumer protection arena. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
developed out of the Dodd-Frank Act.155 The CFPB drafts rules, supervises, and enforces 
federal consumer protection laws.156 Title III of Dodd-Frank abolished one of the federal 
regulators, OTS, and expanded duties of others, such as the FRB. 
With so many involved, state legislatures, attorneys general, federal regulators and 
agencies, there will undoubtedly be inconsistent and various rules and regulations 
because all have broad authority to create and implement rules and regulations. Ideally 
                                                
148 FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES, supra note 89. The bank regulators reviewed the foreclosure 
practices and procedures from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010 at the following banks: Ally 
Bank/GMAC, Aurora Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, EverBank, HSBC, JPMoganChase, MetLife, 
OneWest, PNC, Sovereign Bank, Sun Trust, US Bank, and Wells Fargo. The aim of the review was to 
“evaluate the adequacy of controls and governance over servicers’ foreclosure processes and assess 
servicers’ authority to foreclose.” Id. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. 
151 Id.  
152 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Issues Enforcement Actions Related 
to Deficient Practices in Residential Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Processing (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20110413a.htm. 
153 Id. The ten banks to which this request applied are Bank of America, Citigroup, Ally Financial, HSBC 
North America, JPMorganChase, MetLife, PNC, SunTrust, US Bancorp, and Wells Fargo. Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
The CFPB must confer with the applicable prudential regulator or agency before proposing a rule or 
regulation. Id. at § 1002 (24). Prudential regulators or agencies include the FDIC, OCC, FRB, and National 
Credit Union Administration. Id. 
156 Id. at § 311.  
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state and federal officials could jointly modify foreclosure processes and develop 
mechanisms to supervise servicers and protect homeowners. Both sides initially began 
working together, but progress stalled when the parties reached a deadlock.157  
One hindrance is that states and the federal government want foreclosure reform, 
but have no collective thought on how to accomplish it. The federal government has no 
preemptive power over states, who may draft their own reformation rules without 
consulting with or seeking prior approval from federal regulators, OCC and FRB.158 
Thus, tensions are natural as states invade the OCC and FRB’s territory of foreclosure 
reform.159 Moreover, even though there are natural tensions between state and federal 
governments, even states have been unable to compromise to create uniform state 
regulation.160 As states are generally in parity, no one state may emerge as the “leader” in 
the reform effort.161 Consequently, there is choppy federal and state regulation.  
B. Uniform Mortgage Servicing Guidelines 
Federal regulatory agencies are striving to create uniformity in at least one area: 
mortgage servicing. Sarah Raskin of the Federal Reserve Board declares “[t]he longer it 
takes for mortgage servicers to make the operational adjustments necessary to fix their 
sloppy and deceptive practices, the costlier, more difficult it becomes for them to sort 
them out and correct them.”162 Thus, federal agencies are in the process of generating 
uniform mortgage servicing guidelines to address the current system of capricious 
standards for loan modification by servicers.  
Mortgage loan servicers handle the daily aspects of a mortgage loan, such as 
posting mortgage loan payments.163 Mortgage loan servicers may be lenders, but could 
also be separate entities entirely.164 Servicers are required to notify borrowers on which 
company serves as the mortgage loan servicer.165 Borrowers, upon proper notice, make 
mortgage payments to the servicer, which credits the appropriate account. However, upon 
default, a servicer has the authority to negotiate mortgage workouts or modifications or 
commence foreclosure proceedings.166 
                                                
157 Maxwell Strachan, State Officials, Federal Regulators Could Issue Separate Orders for Foreclosure 




160 Michael King, Foreclosures, Loan Modification Reform May Stall Due to Lack of Leadership, TOTAL 
MORTGAGE SERVICES (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.totalmortgage.com/blog/Foreclosures/Foreclosure-
Loan-Modification-Reform-May-Stall-Due-To-Lack-Of-Leadership/111129.  
161 Id. (quoting Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, “Nobody is driving the bus. Or to put it more certainly, 
each agency gets an hour to drive the bus.”). 
162 Raskin, supra note 66. 
163 Mortgage Servicing: Making Sure Your Payments Count, FED. TRADE COMM. (2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea10.shtm.  
164 Glen Setzer, Mortgage Servicing Rights: Traded Like Baseball Cards?, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (June 
6, 2005), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/662005_Mortgage_Servicing.asp 
165 Id. 
166 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-93, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: ADDITIONAL 
MORTGAGE SERVICER ACTIONS COULD HELP REDUCE THE FREQUENCY AND IMPACT OF ABANDONED 
FORECLOSURES 1–2 (2010). 
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One major problem that consumers encounter when seeking mortgage workouts or 
modifications is that the identity of loan servicers might change a number of times as the 
mortgage is sold repeatedly on the secondary mortgage market.167 Thus, a borrower may 
struggle to find the proper party to contact for help. In some instances, even though a loan 
servicer is known by the borrower, requests for relief may fall on deaf ears due to a 
servicer’s unwillingness to meet borrowers’ needs.168 
The year 2009 proved to be a year of major change with the enactment of several 
federal foreclosure protection regulations coming into fruition.169 Perhaps sensing a 
change in the tide, in 2009, borrowers began complaining that although mortgage 
servicers had the ability to negotiate loan workouts or modifications, a large majority of 
loan servicers failed to do so, causing foreclosure numbers to escalate.170 For example, in 
2009, the Ohio Attorney General filed suit against American Home Mortgage Servicing, 
Inc. (American Home), which serviced approximately 17,000 subprime loans in the state, 
for violating the Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act.171 The Attorney General alleged that 
American Home ignored “requests for assistance,” provided “incompetent and inadequate 
customer service,” failed “to modify loans in a timely fashion,” and provided “unfair and 
deceptive terms when it did modify loans.”172 
Unwilling to take responsibility for issues related to borrowers’ complaints, some 
loan servicers “passed the buck” by using the secondary mortgage market as an excuse 
for not modifying a borrower’s mortgage. For example, servicers would argue that only 
the investors, who owned the borrower’s mortgage in an investment pool, could modify 
loans.173 Some made this argument even when the agreement between the mortgage loan 
servicer and investors did not bar a servicer’s ability to modify or work out a loan.174 
Though 2009 was an active year for federal intervention, the federal government 
had played a somewhat limited role in addressing the mortgage foreclosure catastrophe in 
years prior. Beginning in 2008, however, it became apparent that the roaring fire of the 
crisis was gaining strength and the Housing and Economy Recovery Act (HERA) became 
law.175 Part of HERA included the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, which provided 
                                                
167 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-90-62, HOME OWNERSHIP: MORTGAGE SERVICING 
TRANSFERS ARE INCREASING AND CAUSING BORROWER CONCERN 5 (1989). 
168 See generally Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2011). 
169 See, e.g., Housing Programs, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/programs/housing-programs/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2012). 
170 Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Grind on as Lenders Fail to Modify Loans, USA TODAY (June 19, 
2007), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-06-18-obama-plan-mortgages_N.htm 
(reporting on the delay, misinformation, and miscommunication from lenders as borrowers seek loan 
modifications); Steve Wartenberg, Ohio Alleges Mortgage Servicer Failing to Modify Loans, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2009/11/06/Mortgage_Servicer_Sued.ART_ART_11-06-
09_A12_K9FJ8A5.html.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. 
173 Karen Weise, When Denying Loan Modifications, Mortgage Servicers Often Wrongly Blame Investors, 
PROPUBLICA (July 23, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.probulica.org/article/when-denying-loan-mods-loan-
servicers-often-blame-investors-wrongly. 
174 Id. 
175 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008).  
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local and state governments with $4 billion “for the redevelopment of abandoned and 
foreclosed upon homes and residential properties.”176  
Subsequently, the Obama Administration introduced the Making Homes 
Affordable Program (MHA) to reduce the number of foreclosures many Americans faced 
in March 2009.177 Under the MHA, qualified borrowers could get help in negotiating 
lower monthly payments or refinancing interest rates.178 Although many programs 
compose the MHA, the two most significant are the Home Affordability Modification 
Program (HAMP) and Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP).179  
The Obama Administration hoped to give homeowners an economic “do-over” 
through modification or refinance. Unfortunately, however, both HAMP and HARP 
proved to be less than the panacea that the Administration anticipated.180 Program flaws 
with HAMP and HARP became fairly apparent by 2010.181 The weaknesses included 
“poor execution, repeated program restructuring, inadequate bank manpower and 
paperwork delays.”182 Further, only a small percentage of all eligible, affected 
homeowners have actually received relief under HAMP and HARP.183 
On May 12, 2011, Diane Thompson, legal counsel for the National Consumer Law 
Center, testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee regarding 
the need for more regulation on mortgage loan servicers, noting their “rogue-ness” and 
lack of accountability.184 According to Thompson, 
Servicers have been and remain largely unaccountable to all stake holders 
for their actions. Servicers do not believe that the rules that apply to 
                                                
176 Id. at § 2301(a). 
177 Home Affordability Modification Program, FREDDIE MAC, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2012).  
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 Acknowledging that the Home Affordability Modification Program (HAMP) has not worked, the 
Obama Administration introduced a plan, which allowed some unemployed borrowers to miss up to a year 
of payments on government-insured mortgages while the borrower seeks employment. See Jim 
Puzzanghera, Obama Administration Boosts Aid for Unemployed Homeowners, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/07/business/la-fi-foreclosure-aid-20110708. 
181 After it modified HAMP to add a modification component for second liens on August 13, 2009, the 
Treasury Department totally revamped the policy guidelines by replacing Supplemental Directive 09-05 
with Supplemental Directive 09-05 Revised. Fannie Mae, Announcement SVC-2010-14, Home 
Affordability Modification Program: Introduction of Second Lien Modification Program (Sept. 21, 2010), 
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/svc1014.pdf. However, these modifications 
did not help achieve the hoped-for results.  
182 Lauren Tara La Capra, Mortgage Mayhem: Homeowners Stranded, THE STREET (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10835727/1/mortgage-mayhem-homeowners-stranded.html. 
183 Craig D. Robins, Problems Continue with HAMP and Federal Mortgage Programs—Is HAMP Dying?, 
LONG ISLAND BANKR. BLOG (May 18, 2010), http://long islandbankruptcyblog.com/problems-with-ham-
federal-mortgage-programs-is-hamp-dying/ (posting that only 295,348 homeowners have obtained 
permanent loan modification out of the 3.2 million eligible mortgagors and mounting frustrations from 
those still seeking relief); see also Duke, supra note 110; Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32 (stating 
that many of the problems she mentioned were due to servicers’ actions, including, but not limited to, 
extensive noncompliance with HAMP requirements, wrongful denial of HAMP benefits, pressuring 
borrowers to opt out of HAMP benefits, or repeatedly ignoring HAMP applications) .  
184 Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32. 
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everyone else apply to them. This lawless attitude, supported by financial 
incentives and too-often tolerated by regulators, is the root cause of the 
failure of HAMP and the wrongful foreclosure of countless American 
families.185  
Thompson argued that HAMP began to fail almost from its inception.186  
Along with others, Thompson endorsed a uniform mortgage servicing system “to 
rein in servicer abuses and restore transparency to our mortgage markets.”187 In her view, 
the national mortgage servicing program should do several things. Thompson argues that 
a uniform mortgage servicing system should: a) eradicate the dual track foreclosure 
system by initiating modification prior to the start of a foreclosure procedure or by 
staying foreclosure proceedings;188 b) offer permanent and affordable modifications to 
eligible homeowners;189 c) include an appeals mechanism for homeowners denied 
modification;190 d) include full documentation of investor restrictions and a required 
waiver of any prohibitions against modification;191 e) be principal reductions if there is a 
net benefit to investors;192 f) eliminate the conflict between servicers and homeowners by 
limiting servicers’ fees to a reasonable amount, permitting a servicer to conduct its 
duties;193 g) permit homeowners to seek the help of a community mediator to resolve out-
of-litigation problems;194 and h) help lower income homeowners receive increased 
funding for legal services representation.195 
As Thompson advocates, federal bank regulating agencies are developing uniform 
mortgage servicing guidelines to “promote safe and sound operation of mortgage 
servicing and foreclosure processing, including standards for accountability and 
responsiveness to borrower concerns.”196 In July 2011, the Federal Reserve Board and 
other bank regulators conducted a horizontal review of fourteen large federally regulated 
mortgage servicers.197 The review exposed serious flaws on multiple levels. The 
                                                
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 8. 
187 Id. at 9. Mortgage Bankers Association CEO David Stevens emphasized that truly national mortgage 
servicing guidelines are needed. Stevens stated, “Of paramount importance to the industry is that any 
national servicing standard be truly national and not yet another requirement on top of the myriad existing 
obligations. Servicers would not have the burden of looking to varying standards created by different 
entities.” Jon Prior, Uniform Servicing Standards Prove Fractious to the Mortgage Market, HOUSINGWIRE 
(May 12, 2011), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/05/12/new-servicing-standards-proving-not-to-be-so-
national. 
188 Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32, at 9. 
189 Id.at 44–49. 
190 Id. at 59. 
191 Id. at 51–52. 
192 Id. at 18. 
193 Id. at 55. 
194 Id. at 62. 
195 Id.  
196 FORECLOSURE POLICIES & PRACTICES, supra note 89, at 8.  
197 On Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 112th Cong. 3 (2011) 
(statement of the Fed. Res. Bd.) [hereinafter Fed. Res. Bd. Statement]. The regulators reviewed the 
following servicers’ foreclosure procedures: Aurora Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, EverBank, 
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shortcomings were related to “foreclosure governance practices, foreclosure-
documentation processes, and oversight and monitoring of third party law firms and other 
vendors.”198 Additionally, there were “deficiencies in loan files, inadequate staffing and 
training, undue emphasis on quantitative production and timeliness instead of quality and 
adequate workload monitoring.”199 The Board and federal bank regulators recommended 
stronger policy and control procedures and more expansive monitoring of servicing 
activities.200 Drawing from the findings and recommendations of the horizontal review, 
the federal bank regulators201 will develop uniform mortgage servicing guidelines that 
“are expected to address the proper handling of both performing and non-performing 
loans, including loss-mitigation procedures and foreclosure processing . . . .”202 The 
overall goal of the uniform mortgage servicing guideline is to improve “customer 
treatment” and provide “better transparency and oversight of mortgage servicers’ 
processes.”203 
As of January 2012, however, no uniform servicing rules have been adopted.204 All 
states’ attorneys general submitted a report that provided for an alternative of principal 
reduction as a part of the uniform servicing rules.205 However, in March 2011, Bank of 
America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and GMAC proposed “Draft 
Alternative Uniform Servicing Standards.”206 The banks proposed “timelines for 
processing modifications, third party review of foreclosures, and single point contact for 
financially troubled borrowers.”207 With the number of parties involved in creating these 
uniform standards, reaching consensus might prove both complicated and far-off. 
C. Strict Compliance with Loan Documents and/or Foreclosure Procedures 
or Related Laws 
In the midst of economic disaster, and with no uniform guidelines before them, 
numerous courts are ensuring proper foreclosure by insisting on strict compliance with 
foreclosure laws and loan agreements. One of the main pre-foreclosure limitations is that 
                                                                                                                                            
GMAC/Ally Bank, HSBC, OneWest, J.P. Morgan Chase, MetLife, PNC Bank, Sovereign Bank, Sun Trust, 
US Bank, and Wells Fargo. See Recent Developments: Defects in Mortgage Servicing and Foreclosure 
Processes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutes and Consumer Credit, Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (Julie L. 
Williams, First Sr. Deputy Comp. & Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). 
198 Fed. Res. Bd. Statement, supra note 197. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 The federal bank regulators involved in designing the uniform mortgage servicing guidelines are the 
Federal Reserve Bank, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Administration, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Federal Housing Agency. Id. All fifty state 
attorneys general are also involved in drafting the uniform foreclosure and servicing rules. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 The Regulation of Mortgage Servicing Bill, S. 967, 112th Cong. (2011), is still in committee. 
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the mortgagee must act in strict compliance with the power of sale language in non-
judicial foreclosure jurisdictions.208 Courts have addressed these issues recently. 
In Hooker v. Northwest Trustee Services, Inc.,209 a federal court in Oregon required 
strict compliance with its statute and dismissed a non-judicial foreclosure action due to a 
lender’s failure to properly record all note assignments.210 In Hooker, the debtors, Ivan 
and Katherine Hooker, obtained a loan from GN Mortgage, LLC. (GN). GN secured the 
loan by a trust deed which listed GN as the lender, MERS211 as the beneficiary and 
Regional Trustee Services Corp. as trustee.212 The trust deed was recorded in the county 
where the land was situated.213 As is common on the secondary market, the beneficiary 
interest switched hands several times.214 Following the debtors’ default, MERS assigned 
the trust deed to Bank of America.215 This assignment was also recorded in the county 
land records where the property was located.216 However, the court discovered that there 
were two beneficiary interest transfers that were not recorded in the county land records, 
but were noted in MERS.217 Strictly adhering to applicable Oregon statutes,218 the court 
held that MERS could not pursue a non-judicial foreclosure, but could elect to pursue a 
judicial foreclosure.219 
In the same vein, Massachusetts courts will not confirm valid title if a mortgagee is 
unable to show the required proof that it was the mortgage holder at the time of 
foreclosure.220 In U.S. Bank v. Ibanez,221 U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo, as purported 
                                                
208 See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011) (recognizing the rule that “one 
who sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid 
execution of the power, and the sale is wholly void.”) 
209 Hooker v. Northwest Trustee Services, No. 10-3111-PA, 2011 WL 2119103 (D. Or. May 25, 2011). 
210 Id. at *3.  
211 To facilitate recording of mortgages that were being resold as securities, the mortgage industry created 
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc., or MERS. However, MERS announced that it will no 
longer participate in foreclosure and bankruptcy businesses effective July 22, 2011. See Carrie Bay, MERS 
Bows Out of Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Proceedings, DSNEWS.COM (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.dsnews.com/articles/mers-bows-out-of-foreclosure-and-bankruptcy-proceedings-2011-07-27. 





217 Id. at *3–5; see also California Orders GMAC Mortgage to Suspend Foreclosures, CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2010/09/california-orders-gmac-mortgage-to-
suspend-foreclosures.html (noting that the California governor demanded that GMAC/Ally Financial prove 
that it is in compliance with state law as a prerequisite to filing a foreclosure action); James v. U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n, 272 F.R.D. 47, 48–49 (D. Me. 2011) (finding GMAC liable for monetary sanctions because it 
submitted an affidavit without personal knowledge); GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. McCarthy, No. S1543-09, 
2010 WL 4155261 (Vt. Super. Ct. 2010) (involving the submission of a revised affidavit when the first 
affidavit was filed without personal knowledge or in the presence of a notary public). 
218 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735(1) (2011) (allowing a trustee to foreclose using a trust deed by advertisement 
and sale if: “trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary . . . are recorded 
in the mortgage records in the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated.”). 
219 Hooker, No. 10-3111-PA, 2011 WL 2119103, at *6-7 (quoting In re McCoy, 2011 WL 477820, at *4 
(D. Or. 2011) that “Oregon law permits foreclosure without the benefit of a judicial proceeding only when 
the interest of the beneficiary is clearly documented in a public record.”).  
220 See, e.g., U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).  
221 Id. at 44. 
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assignees, foreclosed on properties in two separate actions in 2007.222 After their non-
judicial foreclosure sales, the lenders filed separate complaints in the Land Court 
requesting it to quiet title in them so that they could convey clear title to third parties.223 
Massachusetts law, in actions for declaration of clear title following non-judicial 
foreclosure sales, requires plaintiffs to prove entitlement to the relief sought.224 Thus, the 
Court held that U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo needed to prove that they were assignees and 
holders of the mortgages at the notices of sale and subsequent foreclosure sales stages.225  
Because the mortgages were sold several times, there was a substantial delay by the 
record holder of the mortgages to execute the assignments.226 In fact, it took more than a 
year after each foreclosure sale for executed assignments to U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo 
to be recorded.227 Accordingly, the Court denied the relief sought and refused to clear the 
title.228 The Court adhered to the rule that “one who sells under a power [of sale] must 
follow strictly its terms. If he fails to do so there is no valid execution of the power and 
the sale is wholly void.”229 Similarly, New York law protects a homeowner against fraud, 
unfair dealing and theft of its home equity. This law is called the Home Equity Theft 
Prevention Act (HETPA).230 HETPA requires a foreclosing lender to “deliver statutory-
specific notice to the homeowner, together with the summons and complaint.”231 During 
a foreclosure action, a mortgagee or assignee has the burden to substantiate strict 
compliance with HETPA.232 Mortgagee’s failure to prove strict compliance may result in 
a court’s dismissal of the foreclosure action.233 Furthermore, homeowners may allege 
noncompliance or require proof of compliance as an affirmative defense or at any stage 
of the action.234  
Due to the mortgage and foreclosure downfall, mortgagees, trustees, and/or 
beneficiaries are quickly discovering that courts are being more stringent pertaining to 
compliance with foreclosure laws or related laws as conditions precedent to enforcement 
of foreclosure rights.235 Lender or servicer noncompliance will result in dismissal of a 
foreclosure action, either immediately or years after a foreclosure action.236 Therefore, 
                                                
222 Id. at 47.  
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 48. 
225 Id. at 51. 
226 Id. at 52. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 49–50 (quoting Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Mass. 1905)). This rule only applies because 
there is limited judicial oversight in non-judicial foreclosures. 
230 N.Y. PROPERTY § 265-a (McKinney 2011). 
231 See First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Silver, 899 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). In U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n v. Martha Flynn, the court blocked the eviction of a former mortgagor more than a year after 
the foreclosure because the foreclosing party could not prove that it held the beneficiary interest at the time 
of foreclosure. No. 11-8011 (Columbia Cnty. Or. Cir. Ct. June 23, 2011), available at 
http://media.oregonlive.com/business_impact/other/usbank%20v%20flynn%20fed%20win%20oregon(1).p
df. 
232 Silver, 899 N.Y.S at 259. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 165. 
235 Id. 
236 See, e.g., U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). 
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mortgagees must start the foreclosure process over again. The costs of the unenforceable 
foreclosure are borne by the mortgagee. Hence, lenders have more setbacks with non-
judicial foreclosures than they did traditionally, impeding a mortgagee’s ability to 
foreclose quickly. 
D. Loan Modifications, Settlement Conferences, and Penalties for Lenders’ Failure to Act 
in Good Faith  
1. Loan Modifications 
i. State Loan Modification Efforts 
Some courts and legislatures are not simply delaying the process of foreclosure, but 
are hoping to avoid them altogether by affording mortgagors an opportunity to reach a 
work-out or loan modification.  
California. California law requires lenders to engage in loan modification 
discussions with their borrowers to avoid foreclosures.237 The amended law clearly states 
that the legislature’s intent is “that the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent offer 
the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a modification or plan is 
consistent with its contractual or other authority.”238 However, this law does not 
adequately help borrowers avoid foreclosure because it neither explicitly imposes a duty 
on lenders to modify a mortgage nor gives borrowers a right to sue under the statute.239 
Oregon. The Oregon legislature sought to prevent the high number of homeowner 
foreclosures by amending Oregon’s foreclosure laws in 2009.240 Senate Bill 628 amended 
Oregon Revised Statutes § 86.740 by mandating mediation between the trustee and 
grantor before a foreclosure sale based on a residential trust deed.241 The purpose of the 
mediation is to avoid a foreclosure sale. Therefore, either a trustee or grantor may offer a 
reasonable settlement proposal that amends the original loan agreement.242 Failure to 
comply with the mandatory mediation requirements may result in the beneficiary’s ability 
to foreclose on the trust deed.243 Unfortunately, however, legislators soon discovered that 
modified law was not the anecdote to the state’s foreclosure problems; more revisions 
were necessary.  
In 2011, legislators revisited the issues and introduced Senate Bill 827244 to solve 
the problems unaddressed by the 2009 amendments. Particularly, the legislators 
discovered three main issues with the 2009 law. First, many homeowners did not 
participate in the mediation sessions; some simply failed to file requests for modifications 
                                                
237 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.6 (West 2011).  
238 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.6 (b) (West 2011). 
239 See Argueta v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. CIV. 2:11–441, 2011 WL 1376701, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 
2011) (following Farner v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 08cv2193, 2009 WL 189025, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 
2009)). 
240 S.B. 628, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).  
241 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740 (4) (2009). 
242 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740 (5) (2009). 
243 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.740 (5)(1) (2009). 
244 S.B. 827, 76th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011). 
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and reviews within the requisite timeline.245 Countless numbers of homeowners failed to 
identify the lender or beneficiary.246 Also, because they were in loan modification 
discussions with their lender, some homeowners were under the misperception that they 
did not have to submit to modification form.247 Second, there was no statewide oversight 
over compliance with the 2009 law.248 Beneficiaries were merely required to file 
compliance affidavits with the county records office.249 Furthermore, the information was 
one-sided, showing only the beneficiary’s perspective of the mediation process and not 
the homeowner’s viewpoint.250 Third, the 2009 amendment did not eliminate the risk of 
dual track foreclosure and settlement; the foreclosure clock still ran even though a grantor 
and beneficiary were in negotiations to modify their loan agreements, or if the grantor 
was in a trial modification period and making trial payments.251  
Oregon legislators hoped that Senate Bill 827 addressed the above problems by 
proposing the following five amendments. First, modification forms needed to be 
standardized.252 By standardizing the loan modification form, the legislators believed that 
homeowners would more readily identify it in the enormous stack of papers that usually 
accompanies foreclosure notifications.253 Further, it would more clearly alert 
homeowners that they needed to fill out a modification form for participation in the 
mediation program, even if verbal discussions of modification were in progress.254 
Second, the new rules required borrowers to file a declaration with the county records 
office that verified that they requested a loan modification and review in accordance with 
state law and within the required timeline.255 Third, a beneficiary would be mandated to 
send a copy of its compliance affidavit to the state’s Department of Justice upon filing 
affidavits with the county’s recorder of deeds. Fourth, all beneficiary affidavits would be 
amended and standardized as well. Finally, and most importantly, beneficiaries would not 
be permitted to move forward with the foreclosure process until five days after they filed 
the compliance affidavits.256 Thus, no public notice of the foreclosure would be possible 
until day eighty-two under the new proposal.257 These new changes, if adopted, would 
offer the broadest protections to homeowners and hopefully curtail the number of 
foreclosures in Oregon.  
Failure to comply with the proposed law would impede a lender’s ability to 
commence a non-judicial foreclosure action of a principal residence mortgage if: 1) after 
notice was mailed to the borrower, the housing counselor’s deadline to notify the 
designated contact person of the borrower's modification request has not expired;258 2) 
                                                
245 Id. 
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within fourteen days after the lender mailed the notice to the borrower, the borrower has 
requested a meeting with the designated contact person and it has not been ninety days 
after notice was mailed;259 3) the borrower had requested a meeting with the designated 
contact person and provided necessary documents if requested, but the designated person 
had not met or negotiated with the borrower;260 4) the borrower and mortgagee had 
agreed in writing to modify the mortgage loan and the borrower was not in default under 
the agreement;261 and 5) calculations under § 3205c (1) show that the mortgagor is 
eligible for a loan modification, and non-judicial foreclosure is not allowed under 
§ 3205c (7).262 
Michigan. Michigan, one of the economies hardest hit by the modern recession,263 
has tenaciously sought to slow the progression of foreclosure filings by enacting three 
temporary laws in 2009: Public Acts 29, 30, and 31.264 Within fourteen days of receiving 
notice of a foreclosure, a borrower must request a meeting with an approved housing 
counselor.265 Upon doing so, the foreclosure sale may not commence until ninety days 
after the notice is mailed.266  
Under Public Act 29,267 a lender or its agent is halted from commencing a non-
judicial foreclosure of a principal residence mortgage if the foreclosing party failed to 
mail the requisite notice to the borrower under Public Act 30 of 2009.268 The notice to 
borrower must include, among other things, the name of the lender’s designated contact 
authorized to settle with the borrower.269 Michigan’s Public Act 30 requires the 
foreclosing party to notify the borrower of his rights within seven days after mailing a 
notice of default/sale.270 The notice must be published once “in the same manner as is 
required for publishing a notice of foreclosure sale.”271 The notice warns the borrower of 
his or her ability to seek a loan modification.272 Should a borrower seek loan 
modification, he or she is required to contact an approved housing counselor within 





263 According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Michigan is the only state to have its population decline between 
2000 and 2010. It is estimated that over the past ten years, Detroit has lost 25% of its residents. See Lauren 
Knapp, Detroit’s Population Decline: 1 Person Departed Every 22 Minutes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 23, 
2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/03/-sarah-hulett-of-michigan.html. 
264 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (a), § 600.3205 (b), and § 600.3205 (c) repealed by MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (e) (West 2011). These new laws will only affect foreclosures on primary residence 
mortgages started after July 5, 2009. These laws mimic the federal loan modification plan, the Making 
Homes Affordable Program. Legislation and Policy, FORECLOSUREDETROIT.ORG, 
http://www.foreclosuredetroit.org/pages/Legislation_Policy_Foreclosure_Detroit (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012). 
265 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (a), § 600.3205(c) (West 2011). 
266 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205 (a)(1)(e). 
267 2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 29. 
268 2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 29 (a)–(h). 
269 2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 29. 
270 2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 30 (k)(4). 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at (d) 
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fourteen days after the list is mailed.273 Within ten days of being contacted by a borrower, 
a housing counselor must contact a lender’s designated contact of a borrower’s decision 
to modify.274 Upon being contacted by a housing counselor, a mortgage holder or its 
servicer must determine the borrower’s modification or work out eligibility.275 
Eventually, a housing counselor will schedule a meeting between the borrower and 
lender.276 A housing counselor will attend the meeting only if the borrower specifically 
requests it.277 The meeting(s) must “be held at a time and place that is convenient to all 
parties, or in the county where the property is situated.”278 
Public Act 31 “provides that if the meeting specified in Public Act 30 does not 
result in an agreement to modify the mortgage loan, the lender/servicer or its agent shall, 
with some exceptions, work with the borrower under Section 3205c to apply a loan 
modification program” or other settlement that complies with relevant paragraphs of 
§ 3205c.279 A lender may use the loan modification program to lower the “ratio of the 
borrower's housing-related debt (including principal and interest, taxes, insurance and 
association fees) to the borrower's gross income of 38% or less, on an aggregate basis.”280 
The goal is to make mortgages more affordable. Public Act 31 outlines mortgagor 
housing-related debt-reduction methods.281 If a lender improperly denies a mortgagor’s 
loan modification request, then the lender will be forced to pursue judicial foreclosure 
only.282 
Washington. Creating an emergency law to reduce foreclosure action filings, the 
State of Washington created the “Prevent or Reduce Owner-Occupied Foreclosure 
Program.”283 Legislators created this program to help borrowers, who are actually in 
foreclosure or on the verge of foreclosure, achieve “work-outs, loan modifications, or 
other results that keep them in their homes.”284 This emergency law sunset on June 30, 
2011.285 
These state efforts, along with the federal government’s loan modification or loss 
mitigation programs, have pulled thousands of families out of foreclosure.286 
                                                
273 Id. 
274 Id. 




279 2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 31. 
280 Id. at (1)(a) 
281 Id. at (b). These methods include:  
(i) An interest rate reduction, as needed, subject to a floor of 3%, for a fixed term of at least 5 
years; (ii) An extension of the amortization period for the loan term, to 40 years or less from the 
date of the loan modification; (iii) Deferral of some portion of the amount of the unpaid principal 
balance of 20% or less, until maturity, refinancing of the loan, or sale of the property; (iv) 
Reduction or elimination of late fees. 
Id.  
282 Press Release, TheLendingEdge.com, Michigan Tries to Slow Foreclosures with New Laws, (June 18, 
2009), available at http://www.free-press-release.com/news/200906/1245382343.html. 
283 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.320.160 (West 2011). 
284 Id. at (1). 
285 Id. 
286 See, e.g., Jocelyn Cockrum, National Foreclosure Rate Slows, Denver Rate Also Down, DENVER POST 
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Unfortunately, though, the loan modification programs do not require lenders to actually 
modify any loan agreements.287 The programs simply provide homeowners with an 
opportunity to talk with mortgagees to possibly avoid foreclosure or modify their 
loans.288 However, servicers or mortgagees have ignored requests for modification or 
inconsistently applied modification standards.289 Thus, without penalties or good faith 
requirements to encourage modification, millions of homeowners will still lose their 
homes, prolonging the housing crisis and annihilating the national economy.  
ii. Federal Loan Modification and Refinance Programs  
a. Home Affordability Modification Program (HAMP) 
HAMP, as a part of the Making Homes Affordable Program, was designed to 
reduce delinquent and at-risk borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments.290 For qualified 
borrowers, HAMP could reduce a borrower’s monthly payments to a more affordable 
amount, no more than 31% of a borrower’s verified gross monthly income.291 Borrowers 
apply for HAMP modifications by filling out and submitting an application to their 
mortgage loan servicers.292 The request for modification is included in the standard 
application.293  
To be eligible for HAMP, a borrower must: a) occupy the mortgaged property as its 
primary residence; b) have received its mortgage prior to January 1, 2009; c) have 
mortgage payments that exceed 31% of its monthly gross income; d) owe no more than 
$729,750 on the mortgaged property; e) be delinquent (or in danger of imminent 
delinquency) in its mortgage payments; f) have documented and sufficient information 
that supports sufficient income to make modified payments; and g) not have been 
convicted, within the last ten years, of felony larceny, theft, fraud or forgery, money 
laundering, or tax evasion, in connection with a mortgage or real estate transaction.294 
HAMP has been essentially ineffective since its genesis295 and criticism of the program 
has gained strength.296 In March 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives moved to cut 
                                                                                                                                            
(Mar. 30, 2012), http://yourhub.denverpost.com/denver/national-foreclosure-rate-slows-denver-rate-also-
down/Uc9TEPOyg3xNmCzJqvMOcJ-ugc?hl. See generally Avoiding Foreclosure, supra note 140.  
287 See Armour, supra note 170. 
288 Id. 
289 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-634, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: FURTHER 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY AND EQUITABLY IMPLEMENT FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 14 
(2010). 
290 Home Affordability Modification Program, supra note 177. The Obama Administration also created 
programs similar to HAMP, such as Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative, FHA Loan Modification, 
and Second Lien Modification Program. MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). 
291 Homeowner Modification Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 
2012).  
292 Id. 
293 Id.  
294 Id. 
295 Testimony of Thompson, supra note 32, at 3. 
296 Jennifer Liberto, House Votes to Kill Obama Mortgage Plan, CNN MONEY (Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/03/29/news/economy/republicans_kill_hamp/index.htm. 
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any new funding to the program by a vote of 252 to 170.297 Many legislators attacked the 
program because “[m]ore homeowners have been kicked out of the program than have 
received permanent relief.”298 Furthermore, failure to comply with HAMP does not give 
homeowners a private right of action against mortgage loan servicers or the ability to 
switch to a different servicer. As one legislator stated, “Homeowners cannot choose their 
mortgage servicing, and lawsuits (outside of bankruptcy) to impose liability on servicers 
for mistreatment of consumers have largely floundered, in part because the servicers 
argue they have no contractual duty to the homeowners—only to the trusts or banks that 
pay them.”299 Therefore, without uniform rules that create mortgage loan servicer 
accountability and liability, HAMP will continue to fall short of its goals.300 
b.  Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) 
In 2009, the Obama Administration introduced HARP “to assist millions of 
struggling home owners make their mortgage payments and hold on to their property.”301 
While HAMP helps homeowners who are past due or in default,302 HARP provides a 
remedy for homeowners who are “performing” on their home loans.303 Under HARP, 
qualified homeowners, whose loans are guaranteed by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae, may 
refinance their mortgages at lower interest rates.304  
                                                
297 H.R. 839, 112th Cong. (2011). 
298 Liberto, supra note 296 (quoting Representative Darrell Issa). 
299 Andrew Martin, A Critic’s Take on the Mortgage Modification Program, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 10, 
2011, 12:48 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/a-critics-take-on-the-mortgage-modification-
program/ (quoting law professor Katherine Porter). 
300 See generally Lorraine Woellert, Anti-Foreclosure Program Shows Participation Gains, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/foreclosure-prevention-program-shows-
gains-amid-criticism.html (noting that HAMP has helped approximately 579,650 borrowers out of the 
millions of foreclosure filings in 2010, short of its goal to help three to four million homeowners). 
301 Progress of the Making Home Affordable Program: What Are the Outcomes for Homeowners and What 
Are the Obstacles to Success?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity and 
U.S. H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Dave Stevens, Asst. Sec’y 
for Housing and Fed. Housing Auth. Comm’r for U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urb. Dev.), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cir/test090909.cfm.  
302 Home Affordable Refinance Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-rates/Pages/harp.aspx (last updated Jan. 6, 2012). 
Similar refinance programs include Making Homes Affordability Program (MHAP), Mortgage Refinance 
Program, Federal Mortgage Home Refinance Program, Bad Credit Mortgage Refinance, FHA Streamline 
Refinance Program, Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Plan, Refinance with Little Equity Plan, No Document 
Mortgage Refinance Program, Mortgage Relief Plan, and Short Refinance Program. See, e.g., Explore 
Programs, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/view-all-
programs/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Mar. 29, 2012). 
303 Home Affordable Modification Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated Apr. 25, 
2012); Home Affordable Refinance Program, supra note 302. 
304 In addition to having mortgages guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, homeowners qualify for 
HARP if: 1) the mortgage was sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac on or before May 31, 2009; 2) the 
mortgage was not refinanced previously under HARP, unless it was a Fannie Mae loan refinanced under 
HARP between March and May 2009; 3) the loan-to-value ratio is greater than 80%; 4) they are current on 
their mortgage payments, with no late payments made in the past six months, and no more than one late 
payment in the last year; 5) the refinance improves the “long-term affordability or stability” of their 
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The housing and mortgage crisis has devastated housing prices, eating up 
homeowner equity.305 Homeowners may be unable to refinance their mortgage loans if 
they have low or negative equity in their homes. That is, if their mortgage balance is 
nearly equal to or exceeds the value of their homes, then traditional refinancing may be 
unobtainable.306 Thus, without any assistance, homeowners may decide to “strategically 
default,” even though they are current on their mortgages.307  
It is reported that “more than 800,000 borrowers” have taken advantage of the 
HARP refinancing program by refinancing their mortgages.308 However, this pales in 
comparison to the estimated 4 million borrowers who “appear to meet the basic eligibility 
for HARP refinancing.”309  
Elizabeth Duke, a member of the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve 
Board, believes that low HARP participation is due to other resistance or impediments to 
refinancing.310 Duke suggests “four possible frictions” to HARP refinancing.311 First, 
Duke believes that loan-level pricing adjustments (LLPA) may discourage homeowners 
from participating in HARP.312 LLPAs may substantially raise refinancing costs, which 
may deter some homeowners.313 Second, Duke suspects that participation levels are 
likely related to “limited lender competition” for HARP refinancing.314 Duke opines that 
lenders are cautious in adopting prior underwriting “putback” risks.315 Third, another 
friction Duke credits for low participation in HARP is that junior lienholders refuse to 
                                                                                                                                            
mortgages; and 6) they have the ability to make the refinanced loan payments. Frequently Asked Questions, 
HOME AFFORDABLE REFINANCE PROGRAM, http://www.harpprogram.org/faq.php#5 (last visited Apr. 3, 
2012). 
305 Office of Policy Dev. & Research, U.S. Housing Market Conditions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., 3 (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/ushmc/summer11/USHMC_2q11_summary.pdf (noting a 
decline rate in home values of 2.5% for existing homes during the first quarter of 2011 and a 5.5% decrease 
from 2010). 
306 See Tuttle, supra note 24.  
307 Id. But see Jessica Silver-Greenberg, House Is Gone but Debt Lives On, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904060604576572532029526792.html (reporting a surge 
in the pursuit of deficiency judgments by lenders in general and mainly against borrowers who strategically 
defaulted on their mortgages).  




312 Id. “LLPAs are upfront fees that are added to the refinancing costs of loans that are judged to have 
higher risk characteristics, such as high loan-to-value ratios.” Id. 
313 Id. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. A mortgage “putback” means that the loan originator repurchases the mortgage from the entity 
currently holding the security. See, e.g., Ash Bennington, Citi Could Face a $22 Billion Loss on Put-Back 
Mortgage Bonds, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/39737924/Citi_Could_Face_A_22_Billion_Loss_On_Put_Back_Mortgage_Bonds
. An originator typically repurchases the mortgage upon fraud or misrepresentations of a mortgagor’s 
creditworthiness or appraised value of the security. Id. According to Duke, under these circumstances, 
“lenders who process HARP refinancings have putback risk both from the refinance and from the original 
underwriting, even if the refinancing lender did not underwrite the original loan.” Duke, supra note 110. 
Many lenders may be hesitant to refinance loans in which they took no part in the loan origination. 
Consequently, many mortgagors are unable to participate in HARP, even though they may qualify. Id. 
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subordinate to the new HARP refinanced loan.316 Fourth, mortgage insurers guarantee or 
agree to take on any risk of default with a lender in making a loan.317 Duke suspects that 
the final obstacle to HARP refinancing might be mortgage insurers’ refusal to re-
underwrite their policies.318  
Although it could help lower defaults and foreclosures by making mortgages more 
affordable, HARP, like HAMP, has floundered, failing to make any noteworthy changes 
for a majority of distressed homeowners. Perhaps more homeowners would participate if 
the four impediments to HARP refinancing were removed.319 However, many queries 
linger, including: 1) who may remove these obstacles to refinancing; and 2) how may 
these impediments be removed. 
In response to the criticism of Duke and others, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, announced changes to HARP in 
October 2011.320 The FHFA modified HARP in the following five ways. First, more 
underwater debtors are now eligible for HARP refinancing because the FHFA removed 
the 125% loan-to-value cap for fixed-rate mortgages backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.321 Irrespective of a homeowner’s loan-to-value ratio, a borrower who meets 
HARP’s other requirements may now qualify for HARP refinancing. Second, the FHFA 
waived upfront loan-level fees for borrowers who refinance into shorter-term mortgages, 
                                                
316 Duke, supra note 110. Generally, when a senior lienholder modifies its mortgage, it retains its priority 
unless the modification increases the debt amount or interest rate. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 38, 
at § 9.4. Modifications, as anticipated under HARP, could potentially benefit a junior lienholder. HARP 
modifications could reduce the likelihood that a mortgagor will default, causing the senior lienholder to 
foreclose and wipe out the junior lienholder’s security interest. Id. However, many junior lienholders might 
be cautious of HARP refinancings and how it affects their priority status. Therefore, they may hold up a 
homeowner’s refinancing process to investigate the effects. Duke, supra note 110 (stating that junior 
lienholder can hold “up the HARP process” by refusing to “remain subordinate to a proposed new 
refinance loan”). 
317 MGIC’s Underwriting Guide, MORTGAGE GUARANTY INSURANCE CORP., 7–8 (2011), 
http://www.mgic.com/pdfs/71-40600_uwguide.pdf. Before agreeing to underwrite a mortgage, a mortgage 
insurer will usually thoroughly assess a mortgagor’s likelihood of default. Id. at 7. During the underwriting 
process, a mortgage insurer will review: “the borrower’s willingness and ability to repay the loan”; “the 
borrower’s commitment to the property”; “the housing and economic conditions in the property’s market; 
the marketability of the property and justification of its value as documented in the appraisal or other 
acceptable alternative; and the loan program (for example, ARM vs. fixed payment).” Id. Upon mortgagor 
default, a lender, who paid a premium initially, suffers a loss and is paid by the mortgage insurer for the 
loss. Id. 
318 Duke, supra note 110. This refusal to re-underwrite is “despite presumably diminished default risk after 
the refinancing.” Id. Though there are no reports on this issue, a mortgage insurer may hesitate to re-
underwrite a mortgage because: 1) of the costs to the insurer, such as re-investment of time and resources to 
evaluate the mortgagor’s background; 2) concerns related to a mortgagor’s ability to pay; or 3) trepidations 
that the housing market has not yet bottomed out. As Duke pointed out, the risks of HARP refinancing only 
presumably diminishes the risk of default, but does not guarantee it. Guaranteeing against default is, in fact, 
a mortgage insurer’s responsibility. Mortgage insurers may not feel that the timing is yet ripe or prudent to 
re-underwrite policies. Id. 
319 Id. 
320 News Release, Fed. Housing Finance Agency, FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Announce HARP 
Changes to Reach More Borrowers (Oct. 24, 2011), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22721/HARP_release_102411_Final.pdf  
321 Id.  
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i.e., those less than twenty years, and lowered other borrower fees.322 Third, the FHFA no 
longer mandates new property appraisals if a reliable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
automated valuation model estimate exists.323 Fourth, to increase lender participation, the 
FHFA waived certain lender representations and warranties liabilities related to making 
original loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.324 Finally, for 
mortgages originally sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac on or before May 31, 2009, the 
FHFA extended the availability of HARP until December 31, 2013.325 
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
i. Mediation 
Foreclosures not only result in losses to mortgagors, but can also burden a judicial 
system with extraordinary influxes of foreclosure filings. To ease this burden, a few 
jurisdictions have created mandatory or voluntary mediation programs. The below 
programs are illustrative of some of the state alternative dispute resolution efforts 
undertaken. 
Connecticut. In Connecticut, the Chief Court Administrator created a residential 
foreclosure mediation program for each state judicial district.326 The Connecticut 
residential foreclosure mediation program was designed to “address all issues of 
foreclosure, including, but not limited to, reinstatement of the mortgage, assignment of 
law days, assignment of sale date, restructuring of the mortgage debt and foreclosure by 
decree of sale.”327 Only court-specified mediators can conduct the mediation.328 Along 
with their mediation duties, the mediators can refer participating mortgagors to 
“community-based resources when appropriate” and other “mortgage assistance 
programs.”329  
Delaware. Delaware also created a court-based mediation program in 2008 in 
response to an upturn in foreclosure filings.330 A group of lawyers (for mortgagors and 
mortgagees), bankers, consumer advocates, and housing counselors worked to create a 
foreclosure mediation program for Delaware courts.331 Under the mediation program, a 
                                                
322 Id.  
323 Id.  
324 Id. 
325 Id.  
326 Notice Regarding the Foreclosure Mediation Program P.A. 09-209, STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/press270.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).  
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. In June 2009, Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court created a mandatory foreclosure mediation program 
modeled after Connecticut’s mediation program. 2009 Me. Laws ch. 402. 
330 Press Release, Del. State Housing Auth., State Launches New Program to Help Homeowners Facing 
Foreclosure (Sept. 10, 2009). The residential foreclosure mediation program  
is limited to homeowners who own a one to four unit home and reside in the home as their primary 
residence or reside in one of the units of a one to four unit home as their primary residence and the 
mortgage on that property which is their primary residence is being foreclosed. 
Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, No. 2011-2, 2–3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2011) 
(admin. directive). 
331 Del. State Housing Authority, supra note 330. 
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plaintiff, upon initiating a foreclosure action, must notify the homeowner and send him a 
“Special Notice Hotline Flyer, providing a hotline number . . . , a Universal Intake Form, 
 . . . and a Foreclosure Intervention Counseling Client’s Checklist . . . .”332 The Special 
Notice Hotline Flyer will implore the mortgagor to contact a HUD-certified housing 
counselor.333 The HUD counselor will then “provide the homeowner with information 
pertaining to the Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Program.”334 Also, the flyer will 
“encourage the homeowner” to stay in touch with the foreclosing party.335  
Florida. Similarly, in Florida, a task force created and presented a model, uniform 
mediation program to be implemented by each circuit chief judge.336 Under the Florida 
mediation program, all residential homestead foreclosures are referred to mediation, 
“unless the plaintiff and borrower agree otherwise or unless effective pre-suit mediation 
that substantially complies” with the mediation program has already taken place.337 The 
Florida Supreme Court adopted the recommendation “as the best method to open 
communication and facilitate problem-solving between the parties to foreclosure cases 
while conserving limited judicial resources.”338 Included within the mediation program is 
the ability of the parties to opt out of mediation  
if they participated in pre-suit mediation either directly through the 
managed mediation program or through a Supreme Court-certified circuit 
civil mediator specially trained to mediate residential mortgage 
foreclosure actions, providing the borrower has participated in foreclosure 
counseling, there has been a supervised exchange of plaintiff and borrower 
disclosures, and mediation resulted in either settlement or impasse. In 
order to qualify as an opt-out from the managed mediation program, pre-
suit mediation must share characteristics of the managed mediation 
program; that is, it must be independent, genuine, fair and impartial.339  
Nevada. Nevada law gives mortgagors the option to choose mediation to 
circumvent foreclosures by power of sale and modify their mortgages.340 In Nevada, a 
mortgagor is given a form accompanied with an envelope addressed to the Mediation 
Administrator if he or she chooses mediation or a waiver of mediation form if he or she 
does not choose mediation.341 The Mediation Administrator then assigns the mediation to 
                                                




336 Final Report and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, No. AOSC09-54, (Fla. 
Dec. 28, 2009) (admin. order). The mediation program “applies to all residential mortgage foreclosure 
actions filed against homestead property involving loans that originated under federal truth in lending 
regulations.” Id. 
337 Id. Only the mediators who are specially trained in residential mortgage foreclosure matters will be 
assigned to mediate cases under the uniform Florida mediation program. Id. 
338 Id. 
339 Id. 
340 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086 (2011). 
341 § 107.086 (2)(a)(3). 
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a justice, judge, hearing master, or other designee for scheduling.342 A mortgagee may 
not exercise its power of sale foreclosure until the completion of the mediation.343 
Further, by dangling mediation as a prerequisite to exercising a power of sale foreclosure, 
mortgagees are incentivized to attend mediation sessions, bring required documents to the 
mediation, and, most importantly, participate in good faith. The court may impose a 
sanction for the failure to do any of these actions.344 The sanctions may be whatever the 
court deems appropriate, including requiring a loan modification.345 
Rhode Island. Rhode Island legislators passed new legislation in 2009 that provides 
for optional foreclosure counseling.346 When Rhode Island mortgagors receive a notice of 
default, they are also informed of the right to seek foreclosure counseling by a HUD-
approved mortgage counselor.347 If a mortgagee fails to provide a mortgagor the right to 
foreclosure mediation, then a foreclosure sale may be deemed void.348 The new law does 
not, however, instruct the parties on how to reach a conclusion or describe what happens 
if the parties fail to reach an agreement. 
Washington. Upon contacting a housing counselor, qualified Washington 
mortgagors might be recommended for Washington’s Foreclosure Mediation Program.349 
Explicitly stated in the law is the requirement that both the mortgagor and 
beneficiary/trustee act in good faith.350 Failure to act in good faith will cause dire 
consequences for either party. While the mortgagor may be unable to modify the terms of 
the mortgage agreement, the beneficiary/trustee right to foreclose might be impaired.351 
ii. Mandatory Settlement Conference 
A few jurisdictions have attempted other remediation efforts, such as mandatory 
settlement conferences. After noting a 150% increase in foreclosure filings from January 
2006 to April 2008, all of the branches of government in New York individually 
proposed loss mitigation strategies related to foreclosure.352 The New York judicial 
system enacted an early court intervention action plan to deal with its high level of 
foreclosures.353 In the executive branch, New York Governor David Patterson initiated an 
interagency task force, “Halt Abusive Lending Transactions” (HALT), to stop predatory 
lending practices and foreclosures in 2008.354  
                                                
342 § 107.086 (2)(b). 
343 § 107.086 (3). 
344 § 107.086 (5). 
345 Id. 
346 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-27-3.1 (b) (West 2011). 
347 Id. 
348 § 34-27-3.1 (c). 
349 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.0002 (West 2011) (entitled the “Foreclosure Fairness Act of 2011”).  
350 § 61.24.0002 (iv). 
351 Id. For more information on foreclosure mediation and federal support, see Melanca Clark & Daniel 
Olmos, Foreclosure Mediation: Emerging Research and Evaluation Practices, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
(2011). 
352 Judith S. Kaye & Ann Pfau, Residential Mortgage Foreclosures: Promoting Early Court Intervention, 
N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2–4, (2008), 
http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/ResidentialForeclosure6-08.pdf..  
353 Id.  
354 Press Release, Office of Governor David A. Patterson, Governor Patterson Announces Request for 
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Finding the HALT report’s numbers unacceptable, the New York legislature 
reformed its subprime lending legislation. Among other changes, the legislature amended 
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3408.355 For foreclosures involving 
residential mortgages originated  
between January 1, 2003 and September 1, 2008, or sub-prime, or non-
traditional loan where the defendant [mortgagor] is a resident of the 
property, the court must hold a voluntary conference within sixty (60) 
days after the date proof of service of the foreclosure is filed with the 
county court clerk, or on an adjourned date agreed to by the parties, if the 
defendant-homeowner requests a conference.356  
With this change, when lenders and borrowers begin negotiations for loan modification, 
failure to act in good faith could have dire consequences for either party, but especially 
lenders.  
Along with the legislative and executive branches, New York courts also addressed 
deficiencies in loan modification negotiations. In IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-
Horoski,357 the Supreme Court in Suffolk County, New York took a hardline stance 
against a lender after it failed to “even find so much as a scintilla of good faith” on 
lender’s behalf while negotiating a loan modification with a mortgagor.358 The mere 
filing of a foreclosure action by a lender invokes the court’s equity jurisdiction.359 At that 
juncture, the court must review the evidence on the whole to determine if equitable relief 
for the lender will be permissible.360 If a lender’s conduct is “willful or unconscionable” 
or “of such a nature that honest and fair minded folk would roundly denounce such 
actions as being morally or ethically wrong,”361 then a court may decide to dismiss the 
lender’s action, finding a lender is without recourse in a court of equity.362 
The Yono-Horoski court found that the lender’s conduct was “greatly egregious and 
so completely void of good faith that equity cannot be permitted to intervene on its 
                                                                                                                                            
Proposal to Assist Homeowners Facing Foreclosure (June 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr080619a.htm. In a December 2008 report, the HALT task force found a 
correlation between the type of mortgage and rate of delinquency and foreclosure. Id. The task force further 
observed a definite link between the high level of delinquency and adjustable rate mortgages. Id. It 
suggested that subprime adjustable rate mortgages were “the primary driver, with nearly one-third of such 
loans listed as seriously delinquent during the third quarter of 2008.” Id.  
355 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408 (McKinney 2009). 
356 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (noting that the 
legislature amended the statute in 2009 to expressly require lenders to negotiate settlements in good faith). 
357 IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 313 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 2009). But see IndyMac 
Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (App. Div. 2010) (reversing trial court's order 
canceling mortgage and debt). 
358 IndyMac Bank F.S.B., 890 N.Y.S.2d at 317 (taking notice that the lender rejected all of the mortgagor’s 
reasonable settlement offers, including a modification of the interest rate, a short sale, and deed in lieu of 
foreclosure). 
359 Id. at 318.  
360 Id. at 317. 
361 Id. at 318. 
362 Id. at 319 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, 133 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) and York 
v. Searles, 90 N.Y.S. 37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955), aff’d, 82 N.E. 1134 (N.Y. 1907)). 
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behalf.”363 Moreover, the court held that the lender’s behavior was severe enough to 
warrant monetary sanctions under title 22 of the New York Code, Rules and Regulations 
§ 130-1.1 et seq.364 Thus, the court cancelled the mortgagor’s indebtedness, $292,500, 
and set it aside, making the mortgage unenforceable.365 Additionally, the court cancelled 
and discharged the mortgagee’s recorded mortgage.366 Consequently, neither the 
lienholder nor its successors or assigns would be able to enforce the note or mortgage 
against the mortgagor/debtor.367  
Similarly, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes,368 another New York case, a 
lender sought to modify the mortgage agreement with an adjustable rate component.369 
As a result, the Erie County Superior Court rejected the loan modification, announcing 
that inclusion of an adjustable rate component flew “in the face” of CPLR § 3408 inter 
alia.370 Moreover, the court found that Wells Fargo acted in bad faith and contrary to 
CPLR § 3408 by proposing this modification.371 Thus, the court dismissed Wells Fargo’s 
foreclosure action, without prejudice; it also noted that should the bank pursue another 
action, no additional costs or attorney fees would be awarded absent good cause.372 
Another case that illustrates New York courts’ disdain for subprime adjustable rate 
mortgages is Emigrant Mortgage Co. v. Corcione.373 In Corcione, the Suffolk County 
Supreme Court found that subprime adjustable rate mortgages are products of unequal 
bargaining positions in virtually all circumstances, due to the customs and practices of the 
mortgage lending industry.374 Due to unequal bargaining position and mortgagor’s 
inability to freely negotiate a mortgage, the court viewed the mortgage at issue and its 
documentation as a contract of adhesion, construing it against the mortgagee as the 
drafter.375 In addition to limiting the lender’s ability to collect on interest for a certain 
time period, legal fees, costs, etc., the Corcione court awarded the mortgagor exemplary 
damages in the amount of $100,000, related to the lender’s “shockingly inequitable, bad 
faith conduct.”376  
E. Deferment  
1. Delays 
Attempting to provide time for lenders and borrowers to engage in settlement 
discussions, a few jurisdictions permitted delays in foreclosures. In 2007, foreclosure and 
                                                
363 Id.  
364 Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (2011). 
365 IndyMac Bank F.S.B., 890 N.Y.S.2d at 319. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 320. 
368 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
369 Id. at 632.  
370 Id. at 634.  
371 Id.  
372 Id. 
373 Emigrant Mortgage Co. v. Corcione, 900 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
374 Id. at 610. 
375 Id.  
376 Id. at 614. 
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default rates in California markedly climbed.377 Lenders foreclosed on over 84,375 
foreclosed properties; more than 250,000 properties were in default.378 In July 2008, 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed emergency foreclosure reform into law to 
address the high number of foreclosures.379 Senate Bill 1137 required mortgagees, 
trustees, beneficiaries or their authorized agents to wait thirty days before filing a notice 
of default.380 During this time, lenders are directed to contact borrowers to evaluate 
borrowers’ “financial situation[s]” and “explore options for the borrower to avoid 
foreclosure.”381 Though, at first glance, the law appears to help mortgagors avoid 
foreclosure, it does not require lenders to engage in extensive discussions with the 
mortgagors to modify the loan.382 
In 2009, Colorado enacted House Bill 1276, which gave eligible borrowers a 
ninety-day foreclosure deferment option.383 During the deferment period, a borrower was 
obligated to seek financial counseling from an approved foreclosure counselor384 and 
make partial note payments.385  
Similar to modification programs, delays, as instituted in California and Colorado, 
give mortgagors opportunities to explore settlement options before a foreclosure sale. 
Further, they also allow mortgagors to become better educated concerning the foreclosure 
process by seeking counseling with an approved foreclosure counselor. However, the 
mandatory delay does not require a mortgagee or its servicer to settle; it just provides 
time to settle. 
2. Foreclosure Moratoria 
i. During the Great Depression 
Replicating the foreclosure moratoria models used during the Great Depression, 
some state lawmakers have urged their own legislatures to adopt a mandatory foreclosure 
moratorium. To date, they have been unsuccessful in lobbying the Obama Administration 
                                                
377 U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 30. 2008), 
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-activity-increases-75-percent-in-2007-
3604 (reporting that California had the highest number of foreclosure filings and ranked among the top ten 
in the nation for foreclosures in 2007). 
378 S.B. 1137, ch. 69, § 1(a), 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
379 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (a)(1) (West 2011). 
380 Id. This law applied to residential mortgage loans made between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 
2007 for owner-occupied residences. California law imposed an additional delay of foreclosure that sunset 
on Jan. 1, 2011. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.52 (West 2010), now repealed, which delayed the time before 
a lender could give a borrower a notice of sale, under certain circumstances, for 90 days.  
381 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (a)(1) (West 2011). 
382 Mehta v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1193 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Mabry v. Super. Ct. 
of Orange Cnty., 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 212 (N.D. Cal. 2010) and finding that the requirements of 
§ 2923.5 are “very minimal” in that it does not “require the lender to modify the loan or do very much more 
than have minimal conversations with the debtor to assess their position and inform them of various options 
to avoid foreclosure.”). 
383 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-38-803 et seq. (West 2011). 
384 § 38-38-803 (2). 
385 § 38-38-805 (2)(a) (stating that lenders are required to pay 66.67% of monthly payments to holder’s 
designated receiver). 
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for the imposition of a nationwide foreclosure moratorium.386 The proponents of 
foreclosure moratoria believe that this drastic step is imperative to impede the housing 
and mortgage markets from further collapse.  
During the Great Depression, a record number of homeowners faced foreclosure.387 
It was reported that foreclosures swelled from 134,900 to 252,400 from 1929 through 
1933.388 According to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, banks foreclosed on 
approximately 1000 mortgages per day.389 By the beginning of 1934, many homeowners 
were being foreclosed upon, and many more—an estimated 50% of all urban 
homeowners—were delinquent and in danger of foreclosure.390 Due to the historic 
foreclosure and housing crisis, states attempted resolution by “encouraging lenders and 
borrowers to renegotiate loan terms through mediation boards and other voluntary 
arrangements.”391 Many promoted foreclosure moratoria when foreclosure numbers 
increased further.392  
On February 8, 1933, Iowa became the first state to impose a foreclosure 
moratorium.393 Iowa courts granted a homeowner’s request for deferment of a foreclosure 
action unless the lender could show good cause for not granting such relief.394 Twenty-six 
other states soon followed, enacting legislation to substantially delay or halt mortgage 
foreclosures.395 In New York, all foreclosure actions due to payment of principal default 
were halted until after July 1, 1937.396 Similarly, an Arizona statute specified that in 
current or future mortgage foreclosure actions, a “court may order a two-year 
continuance unless good cause to the contrary is shown.”397  
Minnesota became the second state to enact a statute that postponed foreclosure 
sales for two years.398 The Minnesota statute also extended post-sale redemption periods 
for mortgagors.399 If the court imposed a moratorium, then the court could mandate that 
the debtor pay fair rental value or a portion of income received from the property.400  
A mortgagee challenged the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute in Home 
Building Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell.401 In Blaisdell, the mortgagors applied for an extension 
                                                
386 See H.R. 344, 112th Cong. (2011). 
387 David C. Wheelock, Changing the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great 
Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 569, 570 (2008), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/11/Wheelock.pdf.  
388 Id.  
389 Id.  
390 Id.  
391 Id. at 573.  
392 Id. at 570.  
393 Id. at 573.  
394 Id.  
395 In addition to Iowa, states enacting foreclosure moratoria were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id.  
396 Id. at 574.  
397 Id. 
398 Minnesota Foreclosure Moratorium Law of 1933, 1933 Minn. Laws ch. 339. 
399 Id. 
400 Id. 
401 Home Bldg. Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
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of their redemption period under the Minnesota Foreclosure Moratorium Law.402 The 
mortgagee attacked the law as violating the Contracts Clause, Equal Protection, and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.403  
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota Foreclosure Moratorium Law on 
four grounds. First, the Court found that an economic emergency existed for the state.404 
Second, the Court opined that the law addressed legitimate state ends in that the law was 
“not for the mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basic 
interest of society.”405 Third, the statutory relief was appropriate when compared to the 
nature of the emergency.406 Fourth, the Court believed that the legislation was justified, 
temporary in operation, and limited to the “exigency which called it forth.”407 Therefore, 
the Court held, the statute was constitutional and did not violate the powers afforded to a 
state to address emergency crises.408 
ii. Modern State and Federal Foreclosure Moratoria Movement 
Once more, the nation faced widespread foreclosure actions. However, the lessons 
from the past were not heeded. Following the 2009–2010 robo-signing scandal, a number 
of states again endorsed either substantial delays or complete moratoria of mortgage 
foreclosures.409 The following states demonstrate how moratoria take form.  
Iowa. Iowa’s 1937 statute still remains effective, authorizing a court to halt a 
foreclosure under certain circumstances.410 According to the statute, a homeowner in “all 
actions for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages, deeds of trust of real property, and 
contracts for the purchase of real estate” may request a stay upon filing an answer that 
admits at least some of the indebtedness and breach, if the homeowner’s default or 
inability to pay or perform is “mainly due or brought about by reason of drought, flood, 
heat, hail, storm, or other climatic conditions or by reason of the infestation of pests 
which affect the land in controversy.”411 Additionally, a homeowner may petition for a 
moratorium if the governor declared “a state of economic emergency.”412  
Hawaii. Hawaii lawmakers introduced thirty-two pieces of legislation related to 
foreclosures in 2011.413 On May 5, 2011, the governor of Hawaii signed into law a key 
piece of legislation, Senate Bill 651.414 Senate Bill 651 imposes an absolute moratorium 
                                                
402 Id. at 415. 
403 Id. at 415–16. 
404 Id. at 444. 
405 Id. at 445. 
406 Id. at 447. 
407 Id.  
408 Id. at 447–48. A state’s right to protect its economic interest may be justified even if it interferes with a 
private contract. Id. at 437. 
409 David Streitfield & Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosure Furor Rises; Many Call for a Freeze, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B1.  
410 See IOWA CODE § 654.15 (2007).  
411 § 654.15 (1). 
412 § 654.15 (2). 
413 Foreclosures 2011 Legislation, supra note 31. 
414 Michael Borger, Abercrombie Signs Hawaii Foreclosure Moratorium Bill SB 61, HAWAII HOUSING 
NEWS (May 16, 2011), http://hawaiihousingnews.com/abercrombie-signs-hawaii-foreclosure-moratorium-
bill-sb-651/. 
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on all new non-judicial foreclosures on owner-occupied residences through July 1, 
2012.415 The bill allows homeowners an opportunity to meet with lenders to negotiate a 
foreclosure avoidance agreement or mitigate losses associated with the avoidable 
foreclosure.416 The new law also requires mortgagees, at mortgagor’s election, to 
participate in the Mortgage Foreclosure Dispute Resolution Program (MFDRP) before 
mortgagee may conduct any public sale.417 
Senate Bill 651 thoroughly outlines how to participate in Hawaii’s MFDRP. For 
instance, when providing foreclosure notice, mortgagees must notify mortgagors of the 
right to participate in the MFDRP, using no less than a fourteen-point font.418 The notice 
must also include a list of approved housing or budget counselors with whom the 
mortgagor must consult at least thirty days before the first day of a scheduled dispute 
resolution session.419 Furthermore, within three days of filing its foreclosure action, a 
mortgagee must pay to Hawaii’s Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs a $250 
filing fee, which goes into a mortgage dispute resolution special fund.420 Likewise, a 
mortgagor pays the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs a $300 fee upon 
electing to MFDRP.421 In addition to the fee, the application includes a statement that the 
mortgagor is an owner-occupant.422 During the mediation period, all non-judicial 
foreclosures are stayed.423 Any failure, on behalf of the mortgagee, to act in compliance 
with the requirements of the MFDRP, constitutes a violation of the state’s unfair and 
deceptive trade practices act.424 If a mortgagor chooses to participate in the MFDRP, then 
a mortgagee will have tremendous incentive to act in good faith: a potential treble 
damages award.425 Thus, the penalty for noncompliance is quite substantial.  
Illinois. The courts and attorney general in Illinois also reviewed their state’s 
foreclosure procedures.426 Courts there formed a mortgage fairness committee “to review 
lending and foreclosure procedures in the state.”427 The committee’s main focus is to 
examine the foreclosure process, thereby making it slower and tougher by amending a 
lender’s prerequisites for foreclosure.428  
South Carolina. In May 2011, Chief Justice Jean Toal of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court instituted a mandatory foreclosure intervention program, which, in 
                                                
415 S.B. 651, 2011 Legis., 26th Sess. (Haw. 2011) (amending HAW. REV. STAT. § 667 (2010)).  
416 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-C (a) (2010). 
417 See § 667-D. 
418 See § 667-G. 
419 Id. 
420 See § 667-F. 
421 See § 667-H (3). 
422 See § 667-H (1)–(2). 
423 See § 667-M. 
424 See § 667-F (b). Hawaii’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-2 (2002), 
applies to mortgage loans to consumers. Haw. Cmty. Fed. Union v. Keke, 11 P.3d 1, 15 (Haw. 2000).  
425 Christine Daleiden, A Report of Consumer Protection in Hawaii, HAW. B. J., Sept. 11, 2007, at 4, 6 
(noting that an increase in the number of practices that are now included under the Act may be “due to the 
deterrent effect: of the potential threat of a treble damages award”). 
426 See Press Release, ForeclosureDeals.com, New Legislation Could Slow Illinois Foreclosures Further 
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essence, stayed all pending foreclosure action in South Carolina.429 This was Chief 
Justice Toal’s second administrative order related to foreclosure since the start of 2009. 
The court’s first administrative order was in May 2009.430 The 2009 order was based on 
the creation of HAMP.431 However, because of HAMP’s ineffectiveness, Chief Justice 
Toal noted that the number of foreclosure actions actually increased since 2009.432 
Further, South Carolina trial courts were overly burdened because of HAMP’s inability to 
set the stage for actual loss mitigation, thereby increasing the number of foreclosure 
filings.433 Therefore, a stay of foreclosure actions was critical for two reasons: 1) societal 
benefits, helping debtors avoid foreclosure and homelessness, and 2) judicial economy. 
The goal behind the 2011 administrative order is two-fold. First, a stay of all 
pending foreclosure actions will afford eligible debtor-mortgagors and lender-servicers 
the opportunity to modify their loan agreement under the revised HAMP standards.434 
The stay also permits some state uniformity in how foreclosure actions are handled “so 
that mortgage foreclosure actions are not unnecessarily dismissed, delayed or 
inappropriately concluded while loan modification or other loss mitigation efforts are 
being pursued.”435 Second, a stay of foreclosure actions will lessen the burden on court 
resources.436 
Federal. Advocating a temporary national moratorium on residential mortgages, 
Representative Marcy Kaptur submitted a resolution on July 8, 2011, which is currently 
before the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on Financial Services.437 Kaptur 
stated that a national foreclosure moratorium is justified because: 1) unemployment rates 
remain high at a rate of nine percent;438 2) housing sales remain poor;439 3) construction 
activities are scant;440 and 4) the excess number of vacant homes remains constant, which 
lowers home values and makes the value of homes less than any outstanding mortgage 
balance.441 Consequently, upside-down mortgagors are more likely to become delinquent, 
which could further increase the number of foreclosures.442  
It is highly unlikely that the Obama Administration will adopt the proposed 
resolution because it previously rebuffed earlier pressures for a national foreclosure 
moratorium. In October 2010, despite lobbying by many legislators and consumer 
advocacy groups, the Obama Administration rejected a proposal for a national 
                                                
429 Mortgage Foreclosure Actions, No. 2011-05-02-11 (S.C. 2011) (admin. order). 
430 Mortgage Foreclosure Actions, No. 2009-05-22-01 (S.C. 2009) (admin. order). 
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foreclosure moratorium.443 The Administration denounced the national moratorium 
because it believed that the negative consequences to the national economy of mandatory 
foreclosure stays outweighed any benefits to homeowners.444  
iii. The Pros and Cons of Foreclosure Moratoria  
The Administration’s conclusion is consistent with what historical moratoria have 
illustrated. As the Obama Administration suggested, foreclosure moratoria have 
advantages and disadvantages. An advantage, according to one economist, is that it 
would “provide all market participants with more time to assess asset prices and evaluate 
alternatives.”445 In other words, it gives the relevant parties—mortgagors, mortgagees, or 
servicers—the opportunity to sit down and discuss their state of affairs and find solutions. 
Because a hefty percentage of defaults and subsequent foreclosures are due to adjusted 
interest rates after the expiration of the introductory rate period, a foreclosure moratorium 
would permit homeowners to adjust their personal finances accordingly.446 Further, 
lenders, builders, and other sellers will be able to determine house prices and make 
decisions on whether to lower home prices, build homes, modify loan agreements, or sell 
under the current conditions.447  
On the other hand, however, a disadvantage might include a prolonged down 
market for the housing industry. In a housing crisis, there is an overabundance of 
inventory, which in turn causes housing prices to further decline.448 If a state imposed a 
foreclosure moratorium, then that state may “delay the ability of markets to clear excess 
inventories,” which would arguably “restore [its] financial stability.”449  
While some homeowners (and farmers) were able to save their properties from 
foreclosure during the stay in the Depression, the costs of the moratorium were passed on 
to prospective mortgagors.450 After the moratoria, lenders changed their lending rules, 
making loans more difficult to obtain. 451 Prospective mortgagors paid higher costs for 
any mortgages received or had to put up more security for loans than previous 
mortgagors due to the lenders’ changes. 452 Thus, prospective mortgagors ultimately paid 
a penalty for harsh market conditions not related to or created by their actions.  
Although moratoria relief seemed like a tremendous help for homeowners in 
foreclosure or on the verge of foreclosure, it rarely was. On one hand, foreclosure 
moratoria had a societal benefit in that they curbed widespread homelessness.453 On the 
other hand, however, there was no uniformity on how courts applied the remedy either 
                                                
443 Caren Bohan & Corbett B. Daly, White House Rejects Foreclosure Moratorium, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 
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within a jurisdiction or from state to state during the Great Depression.454 As one author 
stated: 
Many courts determined that it was pointless to grant relief to borrowers 
who had no hope of refinancing their mortgage or making payments or 
who did not act in good faith toward their lender. In addition, courts often 
required borrowers to pay rent or interest to the lender, as well as taxes, as 
a condition for halting foreclosure proceedings.455 
Historical mortgage foreclosure moratoria caused loans to be more expensive and 
hard to procure.456 The inability to foreclose on their securities and receive deficiency 
judgments made lenders raise interest rates, tighten lending criterion and increase 
collateral requirements for their loans.457 As recognized in a 1936 Central Housing 
Committee Report, a statute with “lengthy, expensive, complicated or otherwise 
burdensome foreclosure procedure,” or long redemption periods before a mortgagee can 
realize its debt, caused mortgagees to raise costs.458 According to the report, “prospective 
lenders naturally take into account the procedure available for realizing the debt out of 
the security when determining the conditions on which they will be willing to make 
loans.”459 
Another disadvantage of mortgage foreclosure moratoria is that they affect all 
mortgage servicers, both good and bad. So, both bad and proper acting lenders would 
equally be subject to a moratorium. Also, some courts may apply the rules for moratoria 
inconsistently as courts did during the 1930s.460 Further, state-imposed foreclosure 
moratoria have not adequately solved all of the problems related to a mortgage or housing 
crisis historically. Although homeowners found some relief in no longer facing 
foreclosure, others who entered the housing market later “saw higher costs of credit and 
fewer loans compared with states” that did not impose moratoria.461  
When a government interferes by piercing the mortgagee-mortgagor contractual 
relationship and creating a new mortgage agreement that disregards the consequence of 
default—foreclosure—the cost of future mortgages increases.462 Given a lender’s likely 
consternation that it will have losses if unable to foreclose, it is reasonable to increase 
costs or tighten credit requirements.463 Thus, before a consumer enters onto the mortgage 
financing field, he or she may be more disadvantaged and foreclosed out of the housing 
market. 
Moreover, foreclosure moratoria may only prolong the inevitable—borrower home 
loss—because a mortgagor may be unable to pay and that fact would not likely change at 
                                                
454 Id. at 574 (claiming that “the extent to which courts granted relief to delinquent borrowers varied 
widely, even within a state”). 
455 Id. 
456 Id. at 580. 
457 Id. 
458 Id.  
459 Id. 
460 See, e.g., Wheelock, supra note 387. 
461 Id. (noting that the above occurred following the Great Depression of the 1930s). 
462 Id. at 580. 
463 Id. 
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the expiration of the moratorium. This is especially true if the borrower is unable to repay 
the mortgage due to job loss or income shortages. Consequently, then, the outcome would 
be the same regardless of a moratorium. 
During the Great Depression, the federal government did not impose a national 
foreclosure moratorium. Only states did. The federal government responded to the 
economic crisis by establishing new federal agencies to handle refinancing of defaulted 
mortgages and to “insure, and finance new mortgages.”464 The federal government’s 
response to the modern market collapse is to create new federal agencies once again.465 
However, some states have sought other mitigation measures. 
3. The Dodd-Frank Act 
Acknowledging that restructuring must take place on the front-end, i.e., during the 
loan origination, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) into law on July 21, 2010.466 Dodd-Frank 
launched sweeping financial reforms in multiple areas. Under Title XIV of Dodd-Frank, 
the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, also known as the Truth-in-
Lending Act (TILA),467 is amended. Dodd-Frank modifies TILA by setting forth prudent 
lending standards, consumer protections for both prime and subprime (high cost) 
mortgages, mortgage servicing guidelines, appraisal requirements, and loan 
modification/work-out procedures. The Act makes lenders accountable for their lending 
practices and seeks to protect consumers and stabilize the entire national economy, 
including the real estate market.  
Pertaining to the prudent loan extension criteria, TILA was amended in six ways. 
First, mortgage originators are prohibited from advancing residential mortgages that a 
“consumer lacks a reasonable ability to repay” or “has predatory characteristics or effects 
(such as equity stripping, excessive fees or abusive terms).”468 Second, new regulations 
prohibit mortgage originators from promoting a mortgage that is not qualified under 
§ 129C (b)(2) to consumers who meet the standards for qualified mortgages.469 Third, 
Dodd-Frank specifically bans abusive or unfair lending practices that result in disparate 
extensions of credit among consumers based on race, ethnicity, gender, or age.470 Fourth, 
lenders may not mischaracterize "the credit history of a consumer or the residential loans 
available to a consumer."471 Fifth, lenders are prohibited from improperly portraying the 
appraised value of the property securing the loan.472 Sixth, a lender is barred from 
offering a mortgage if the mortgage originator is “unable to suggest, offer, or recommend 
to a consumer a loan that is not more expensive than a loan for which the consumer 
                                                
464 Id. at 581. 
465 See Building the CFPB: A Progress Report, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 1, 9 (July 18, 
2011) http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf. 
466 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
2136 (2010). 
467 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2011). 
468 Truth in Lending Act § 129B, 15 U.S.C. §1639B (West 2011). 
469 § 129B(c)(3)(B). 
470 § 129B(c)(3)(C). 
471 § 129B(c)(3)(D)(i). 
472 § 129B(c)(3)(D)(ii). 
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qualifies, discouraging a consumer from seeking a residential mortgage loan secured by a 
consumer’s principal dwelling from another mortgage originator.”473  
Each of Dodd-Frank’s prohibitions should result in more widespread consumer 
protection. Under §129B, creditors must make a “reasonable and good faith 
determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is 
consummated,” that the “consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan . . . ,” and 
costs associated with the mortgage, such as, taxes, insurance (guarantee insurance) and 
assessments.474 Lenders must base their “reasonable and good faith determination” on a 
consumer’s ability to pay based on “credit history, current income, expected income the 
consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, [and] debt-to-income 
ratio . . . .”475 Failure to comply with regulations will result in penalties. Consumers are 
either entitled to amounts that do not exceed a consumer’s actual damages, or an amount 
equal to three times the total amount of direct and indirect compensation or gain the 
mortgage originator received in relation to the loan, plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees.476 
Mortgage servicers must follow specific guidelines under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
First, for verifying a consumer’s income, a lender is obligated to review a consumer’s 
“W-2 [forms], tax returns, payroll receipts, financial institutional records, or other third-
party documents that provide reasonably reliable evidence of the consumer’s income or 
assets . . . .”477 Second, residential loans that are not “qualified mortgages” may not 
contain terms for prepayment penalties for paying all or part of the principal after a loan 
is consummated.478 “Qualified mortgages,” under Dodd-Frank, may not include: 1) 
adjustable interest rates;479 or 2) annual percentage rates that exceed the average prime 
rate for a comparable transaction.480 Third, if a state has consumer anti-deficiency 
protections, then a creditor must “provide a written notice to [a] consumer describing the 
protection provided by the anti-deficiency law” and significance of the loss of protection 
before a loan is consummated.481 Further, if a consumer is seeking refinancing, which 
may cause loss of anti-deficiency protection, the lender must “provide a written notice to 
the consumer describing the protection provided by the anti-deficiency law[s]” and 
significance of the loss of protection before the refinance is consummated.482 Finally, 
disclosures in monthly statements for residential mortgages are discussed in full detail in 
§ 1420 of the Act.483  
Dodd-Frank also transforms the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)484 
and mortgage servicing procedures. In relation to mortgage servicing procedures, Dodd-
                                                
473 § 129B(c)(3)(D)(iii). 
474 § 129C(a)(1). 
475 § 129C(a)(3). 
476 § 129B(d)(2). 
477 § 129C(a)(4). 
478 § 129C(1)(A). 
479 § 129C(1)(B)(i). 
480 § 129C(1)(B)(ii). 
481 § 129C(g)(2). 
482 § 129C(g)(3). 
483 § 1420. 
484 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2011). 
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Frank first demands that before the consumer credit transaction is consummated, 
creditors set up an escrow or impound account in a federally insured depository 
institution “for the payment of taxes and hazard insurance, and, if applicable, flood 
insurance, mortgage insurance, ground rents, and any other required periodic payments or 
premiums with respect to the property or the loan terms . . . .”485 Creditors are only 
mandated to take these measures if the consumer credit transaction is “secured by a first 
lien on the principal dwelling of the consumer.”486  
A creditor may be exempt from establishing an escrow or impound account under 
certain circumstances by regulation.487 For instance, the regulating board may waive the 
escrow or impound account requirement if the creditor operates “predominantly in rural 
or underserved areas.”488 Additionally, if a creditor and all of its affiliates has a total 
annual mortgage loan origination that do not exceed a particular set limit, it may not be 
required to set up an escrow or impound account.489  
A creditor must maintain the required escrow account for at least five years, 
beginning with the credit consummation date,490 unless and until: 1) a debtor has 
established “sufficient equity in the dwelling securing the consumer credit transaction so 
as to no longer be required”;491 2) a debtor “is delinquent”;492 3) a debtor is in 
noncompliance;493 or 4) the terms of the mortgage, which established the account, are 
terminated.494 
Dodd-Frank revises RESPA by inserting additional new servicer prohibitions. 
Under the new revisions, servicers of federally related mortgages are prohibited from: 1) 
obtaining force-placed hazard insurance unless there is a reasonable belief that a debtor 
has breached its contractual obligation to maintain property insurance;495 2) charging fees 
when responding to a debtor’s valid written request under RESPA;496 3) failing to timely 
respond to a debtor’s request to correct errors of payment allocation, final balances 
relating to payoff, foreclosure avoidance, or a servicer’s other standard duties;497 4) 
failing to timely respond to a debtor’s request for information pertaining to its creditor’s 
identity, address, or other relevant contact information;498 or 5) failing to comply with the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s obligations.499 Additionally, Dodd-Frank 
                                                
485 § 129D(a).  
486 Id.  
487 § 129D(c)(1) – (4). 
488 § 129D(c)(1). 
489 § 129D(c)(2). 
490 § 129D(d). 
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494 § 129D(d)(4). 
495 12 U.S.C. § 1463. Under RESPA, these new prohibitions are now found at 12 U.S.C. § 2605(a)–(k) 
(2011). Additional information related to force-placed insurance is found in 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2605(k)(2)(1)(1)(A)(i)–(iv).  
496 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(B)(2011). 
497 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(C)(2011). 
498 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(D)(2011). A servicer must respond within ten business days for compliance. Id. 
499 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E)(2011). From time to time, by regulation, the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection may add new servicer duties to carry out the Act’s consumer protection purposes. Id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2012 
 506
increases the penalty amounts for noncompliance of RESPA.500  
To counterbalance issues related to inflated appraisal values, Dodd-Frank 
establishes new appraisal requirements for lower, moderate and higher risk mortgages; it 
also amends TILA by inserting a new section, 129H.501 For an extension of credit for 
higher-risk mortgages, a creditor must first obtain a written appraisal of the property by a 
certified or licensed appraiser.502 The certified or licensed appraiser must conduct a 
physical inspection of the mortgaged property’s interior to satisfy the new appraisal 
requirements.503 A second appraisal may be required for higher risk mortgages under 
certain circumstances.504 In connection to any appraisal made for the extension of higher-
risk mortgage loans, a creditor must provide a free copy of each appraisal conducted 
within at least three days prior to the transaction closing date.505 All appraisals must be 
independent as described under § 129E. Willful noncompliance of the appraisal 
prerequisites by the creditor results in a fine of $2000.506 
One of the most important developments from Dodd-Frank is the genesis of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB’s core duty is to protect 
consumers through enforcing federal consumer financial laws.507 In carrying out its 
duties, the CFPB may draft rules and regulations for all mortgage-related businesses and 
for bank and credit unions with assets of greater than $10 billion.508 The CFPB may also: 
a) supervise and enforce federal consumer financial protection laws; b) address unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive practices or acts; c) receive consumer complaints; d) sponsor 
financial education for consumers; e) research consumer behavior; f) scrutinize financial 
markets for the latest consumer financial risks; g) reduce outdated, unnecessary, and 
overly burdensome regulations; and h) enforce antidiscrimination and other unfair 
treatment in consumer finance.509  
The CFPB offers a “single point of accountability” for financial institutions.510 
Having one enforcer could potentially eliminate inconsistent and duplicative regulations. 
It could also provide consumers with consistent response times and information. Further, 
                                                
500 § 1463. Under RESPA, these new prohibitions are set out in a note in 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) (2011). 
Wherever $1000 appears, it has been replaced with $2000 and under paragraph (2)(B)(i), the new penalty 
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501 12 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1473. 
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503 § 129H(b)(1). 
504 § 129H(b)(2)(A). 
505 § 129H(c). 
506 § 129H(e). Interference with appraisal independence requirements results in separate penalties described 
in § 129H(k)(1)–(3). Dodd-Frank addresses other deleterious concerns caused by foreclosure that previous 
efforts ignored. For example, the HUD Secretary is directed to create a new program under HUD to protect 
current and future tenants and at-risk multi-family properties. See § 1481. The program should be designed 
to accomplish the following four goals. First, it should create sustainable financing. See 12 U.S.C. 
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507 Building the CFPB, supra note 465.  
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509 Building the CFPB, supra note 465, at 9. 
510 Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Sec'y of the Treasury on the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/a-strong-foundation/.  
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the CFPB recognizes that consumer education is crucial.511 Thus, it has begun to educate 
consumers from student-level onward. To reduce the risk of partisanship, the CFPB is led 
by an independent director, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.512 
Dodd-Frank is not without its criticism. Dodd-Frank requires securitizers and 
originators to retain some of the risk, approximately 5%, of the mortgages sold to 
investors on the secondary mortgage market.513 Opponents of this provision of Dodd-
Frank believe that it could impede instead of facilitate the housing market recovery.514 
The concern is that lenders would make it virtually impossible for debtors to obtain 
consumer loans.515 Of course, mortgage bankers, bank lobbyists, and some Senate 
Republicans criticize Dodd-Frank as being overly burdensome on mortgagees.516  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The housing market meltdown has exposed systemic problems with mortgage 
financing and foreclosure structures. As scholars previously argued, the mortgage 
financing system has racial and class biases.517 For example, racial minorities and the 
poor were more likely to receive subprime or high cost mortgages. Similarly, a large 
amount of these subprime mortgages were adjustable rate mortgages with short teaser 
periods. As a result, these borrowers were forced out of their homes and into foreclosure 
when the mortgage adjusted to a rate beyond their affordability. The prolonged housing 
and foreclosure market crises reveal endemic shortcomings in the banking regulatory 
                                                
511 Building the CFPB, supra note 465, at 19. 
512 Id. 
513 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Tit. XIV, 
§ 941, 124 Stat. 2136, 515–21 (2010). Dodd-Frank exempts financial institutions whose securities are 
backed exclusively by qualified residential mortgages from the 5% risk-retention requirement. Id. 
514 Rob Garver, Rule That Could Kill Housing Market, MSN MONEY (Oct. 1. 2011), 
http://money.msn.com/home-loans/rule-that-could-kill-housing-market-fiscaltimes.aspx. 
515 Id. 





024143e9974c&MonthDisplay=4&YearDisplay=2011 (noting the proposal of S. 712, The Financial Repeal 
Takeover Act of 2011, which is designed to repeal Dodd-Frank). Unexpectedly, the shared-risk provision 
of Dodd-Frank created strange bedfellows. Consumer groups, such as the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition and the National Consumer Law Center, who are typically on the opposite side, 
have joined in the bellows of bankers and their lobbyists in criticizing this provision. Garver, supra note 
514. Disapproval of Dodd-Frank is based in part on the belief that it would “narrow the range of loans that 
lenders are willing to originate to the point that only consumers with the best credit scores—meaning white 
and affluent consumers—are going to get loans.” Id. (quoting David Berenbaum, chief program officer 
with the National Consumer Reinvestment Coalition). Recently, U.S. Senator Richard Shelby proposed a 
bill that would compel regulators to consider the economic effect of Dodd-Frank on the economy and job 
creation through a cost-benefit analysis. Katherine Reynolds Lewis, The Push to Pull the Teeth Out of 
Dodd Frank, FISCAL TIMES (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/09/29/The-
Push-to-Pull-the-Teeth-out-of-Dodd-Frank.aspx. 
517 See, e.g., Helen J. Ladd, Evidence on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 41 
(1998) (discussing lender discrimination against minority groups).  
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scheme. 518 
While in foreclosure, the predatory conduct by lenders or their agents continued. 
Some lenders refused to negotiate, in good faith, a loan modification or other settlement 
to prevent foreclosure. Also, some lenders wrongfully foreclosed where mortgagors were 
in compliance with the terms of their loan agreement. Additionally, foreclosures 
proceeded despite documentation errors or failure to prove that the foreclosing party had 
standing to do so. Thus, there were nationwide defects in the foreclosure system, 
irrespective of a jurisdiction’s type of foreclosing method.  
History shows that blanket mortgage foreclosure moratoria do not work. In fact, 
generic moratoria may actually cause more harm than good in terms of prolonging the 
housing crisis.519 All in all, crises reveal “chinks in the armor” in the foreclosure process. 
Upon such revelation, jurisdictions can cautiously reform foreclosure processes and, 
hopefully in turn, halt the housing market and national economic crises. But recently, 
states, lenders, and the federal government have struggled to fix the problems, creating 
only a patchy resolution. 
Even though they have clashing interests at times, it is fundamental that the 
relevant multiple actors play a role in determining these changes. The federal government 
must continue to act to correct the inadequacies of the current foreclosure system due to 
its implications on the national economy, either through legislation or regulation. 
Consumers must play a role so in educating themselves on how to protect their interests 
and avoid delinquencies and defaults. Lenders also need to play a role in the process 
because they are responsible for ensuring compliance with the new rules. All of these 
parties are necessary to create a healthy lending system, uniform servicing policies, 
foreclosure process, and, thus, a stable real estate market.  
There is no magic bullet to prevent default, even under the most conservative 
underwriting standards. Circumstances change throughout the life of a mortgage that may 
make default and foreclosure unavoidable. However, regulations are needed to obstruct 
the creation of mortgage loans that are highly likely to result in default by using prudent 
underwriting standards. Laws like Dodd-Frank are commendable in that they provide 
extensive protections for consumers who are in default. However, they are also 
lamentable in that they “throw the baby out with the bath water.” These laws regulate 
lender behavior so stringently that lenders restrict their liability by limiting loan 
availability, thereby injuring future debtors. Striking the right balance, whatever that 
looks like, may require years of research and should not be reactionary.  
Determining the perfect harmony between consumer protection and lender 
accountability is very difficult. This is especially true if there are too many parties 
working on the solution at varying times. Economic crises typically trigger reformation. 
Therefore, the current economic crisis will, undoubtedly, spark unknown changes to the 
                                                
518 Katherine Porter, a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, stated that the mortgage foreclosure crisis 
“cries out for a national regulatory response, these problems are systemic.” See Christine Harper, 
Foreclosure Crisis Needs Federal Response Harvard’s Porter Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-13/foreclosure-crisis-needs-federal-response-harvard-s-porter-
says.html. 
519 See, e.g., Wheelock, supra note 387. This Article does not advocate blanket moratoria, but 
acknowledges that moratoria or delay under the right circumstances, such as history of foreclosure process 
abuses, might be warranted.  
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lending and foreclosure landscape. Hopefully, however, these changes will produce 
healthier lending and mortgage markets for consumers and lenders. 
